GHSA-cm2r-rg7r-p7gg
MEDIUMFile Browser vulnerable to insecure password handling
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowserReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
All user accounts authenticate towards a File Browser instance with a password. A missing password policy and brute-force protection makes it impossible for administrators to properly secure the authentication process.
Impact
Attackers can mount a brute-force attack against the passwords of all accounts of an instance. Since the application is lacking the ability to prevent users from choosing a weak password, the attack is likely to succeed.
Vulnerability Description
The application implement a classical authentication scheme using a username and password combination. While employed by many systems, this scheme is quite error-prone and a common cause for vulnerabilities. File Browser's implementation has multiple weak points:
- Since the application is missing the capability for administrators to define a password policy, users are at liberty to set trivial and well-known passwords such as
secretor even ones with only single digit like1. - New instances are set up with a default password of
adminfor the initial administrative account. This password is well known and easily guessable. While the documentation advises to change this password, the application does not technically enforce it. - The application does not implement any brute-force protection for the authentication endpoint. Attackers can make as many guesses for a password as the network bandwidth allows.
The combination of these problems makes it likely, that an attacker will succeed in compromising at least one account in a File Browser instance, possibly even one with administrative privileges. The likelihood of such an attack increases substantially for internet-facing instances.
Proof of Concept
The insecure default credentials are documented on the application's website:
The following HTTP communication shows, that a trivial password of 1 can be configured by a user:
PUT /api/users/2 HTTP/1.1
Host: filebrowser.local:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Referer: http://filebrowser.local:8080/settings/profile
X-Auth: eyJ[...]
Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 319
Origin: http://filebrowser.local:8080
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: auth=eyJ[...]
X-PwnFox-Color: cyan
Priority: u=0
{"what":"user","which":["password"],"data":{"id":2,"locale":"en","viewMode":"mosaic","singleClick":false,"perm":{"admin":false,"execute":true,"create":true,"rename":true,"modify":true,"delete":true,"share":true,"download":true},"commands":[],"lockPassword":false,"hideDotfiles":false,"dateFormat":false,"password":"1"}}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 08:31:34 GMT
Content-Length: 7
200 OK
The missing brute-force protection can easily be tested by repeatedly sending the following request to the application with a tool such as Burp or hydra.
POST /api/login HTTP/1.1
Host: filebrowser.local:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 52
Origin: http://filebrowser.local:8080
{"username":"admin","password":"myPasswordGuess","recaptcha":""}
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 08:39:48 GMT
Content-Length: 14
403 Forbidden
After sending 3000 bad passwords to the application within a few seconds, a successful authentication is still possible for the account:
POST /api/login HTTP/1.1
Host: filebrowser.local:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 54
Origin: http://filebrowser.local:8080
Connection: keep-alive
{"username":"admin","password":"myCorrectPassword","recaptcha":""}
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; style-src 'unsafe-inline';
Content-Type: text/plain
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2025 08:39:58 GMT
Content-Length: 508
eyJ[...]
Recommended Countermeasures
The application should add an option to define a password policy in its administrative interface which allows to set a minimum length for passwords. The default settings should be in line with the NIST publication SP 800-63B. This means, that now passwords of fewer than 8 characters should ever be allowed by the application. Whenever a user sets a new password, the application should verify whether that password is part of a "known passwords" list.
The application should either create a secure and random password for the admin account upon initialization or enforce an immediate password change when that user logs in for the first time using the default password.
A brute-force protection needs to be implemented, which limits the allowed amount of authentication attempts per user within a certain timeframe. This implementation should employ device tokens to prevent targeted lockout attacks.
In addition, it would be advisable to allow the integration of the application into and existing Identity Provider using protocols like LDAP or OIDC.
Timeline
2025-03-27Identified the vulnerability in version 2.32.02025-04-11Contacted the project2025-04-29Vulnerability disclosed to the project2025-06-25Uploaded advisories to the project's GitHub repository2025-06-26CVE ID assigned by GitHub2025-06-29Fix released in version 2.34.1. 12 minimum characters as default has been chosen since the implementation does not include protection against brute force attacks.
References
- OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
- NIST Special Publication 800-63B. Digital Identity Guidelines. Passwords
- Pwned Passwords
- Common Credentials
- CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
- CWE-521: Weak Password Requirements
- CWE-1392: Use of Default Credentials
- Original Advisory
Credits
- Mathias Tausig (SBA Research)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | 2.34.1 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.34.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cm2r-rg7r-p7gg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cm2r-rg7r-p7gg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-cm2r-rg7r-p7gg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-cm2r-rg7r-p7gg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-cm2r-rg7r-p7gg across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.