MobSF Path Traversal in GET /download/<filename> using absolute filenamesGHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v
Fix: MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF@7f3bc08GHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v is a Path Traversal vulnerability in mobsf. A fix is available for mobsf — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
mobsfReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The GET /download/<filename> route uses string path verification via os.path.commonprefix, which allows an authenticated user to download files outside the DWD_DIR download directory from "neighboring" directories whose absolute paths begin with the same prefix as DWD_DIR (e.g., .../downloads_bak, .../downloads.old). This is a Directory Traversal (escape) leading to a data leak.
Details
def is_safe_path(safe_root, check_path):
safe_root = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(safe_root))
check_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.normpath(check_path))
return os.path.commonprefix([check_path, safe_root]) == safe_root
commonprefix compares raw strings, not path components. For:
safe_root = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads
check_path = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt
the function returns True, incorrectly treating downloads_bak as inside downloads. Download handler:
# MobSF/views/home.py
@login_required
def download(request):
root = settings.DWD_DIR
filename = request.path.replace('/download/', '', 1)
dwd_file = Path(root) / filename # absolute 'filename' ignores 'root'
if '../' in filename or not is_safe_path(root, dwd_file):
return HttpResponseForbidden(...)
ext = dwd_file.suffix
if ext in settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS and dwd_file.is_file():
return file_download(dwd_file, ...)
If the client supplies an absolute path in filename (starts with / or C:/), Path(root) / filename resolves to that absolute path; the flawed is_safe_path then accepts any sibling directory whose absolute path shares the same string prefix. The ../ check does not catch this.
Which file types are retrievable: Whatever is allowed by settings.ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS
PoC
Prereqs: authenticated user; standard install. Assume:
settings.DWD_DIR = /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads
Prepare a sibling directory with the same string prefix and a test file:
mkdir -p /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak
echo "test" > /home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt
As an authenticated user, request (note the leading / in the filename and the double/triple slash after /download/ to preserve it):
GET /download///home/mobsf/.MobSF/downloads_bak/test.txt HTTP/1.1
Host: <HOST>
Cookie: sessionid=<YOUR_SESSION>
Other working sibling directory names (if present):
…/downloads.old/...
…/downloads_backup/...
…/downloads1/...
…/downloads-archive/...
…/downloads 2024/... (URL-encoded space: downloads%202024)
Impact
Any authenticated user can download files (with allowed extensions) from sibling directories whose absolute paths start with the same string prefix as DWD_DIR.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mobsf | all versions | 4.4.1pip install --upgrade 'mobsf==4.4.1' |
Affected Products
mobile security frameworkopensecurityDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mobsf, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update mobsf to 4.4.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-ccc3-fvfx-mw3v in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.