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GHSA-c9gp-64c4-2rrh

HIGH

Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) with Grav CMS security sandbox bypass

Also known asCVE-2024-28116
Published
Mar 22, 2024
Updated
Mar 22, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
6 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
5.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk92th percentile-56.41%
0.00%26.4%52.7%79.1%57.0%5.8%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘getgrav/grav

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Grav CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which allows any authenticated user (editor permissions are sufficient) to execute arbitrary code on the remote server bypassing the existing security sandbox.

Details

The Grav CMS implements a custom sandbox to protect the powerful Twig methods "registerUndefinedFunctionCallback()" and "registerUndefinedFilterCallback()", in order to avoid SSTI attacks by denying the calling of dangerous PHP functions into the Twig template directives (such as: "exec()", "passthru()", "system()", etc.). The current defenses are based on a blacklist of prohibited functions (PHP, Twig), checked through the "isDangerousFunction()" method called in the file "system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php":

...
$this->twig = new TwigEnvironment($loader_chain, $params);

$this->twig->registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(function (string $name) use ($config) {
    $allowed = $config->get('system.twig.safe_functions');
    if (is_array($allowed) && in_array($name, $allowed, true) && function_exists($name)) {
        return new TwigFunction($name, $name);
    }
    if ($config->get('system.twig.undefined_functions')) {
        if (function_exists($name)) {
            if (!Utils::isDangerousFunction($name)) {
                user_error("PHP function {$name}() was used as Twig function. This is deprecated in Grav 1.7. Please add it to system configuration: `system.twig.safe_functions`", E_USER_DEPRECATED);

                return new TwigFunction($name, $name);
            }

           /** @var Debugger $debugger */
           $debugger = $this->grav['debugger'];
           $debugger->addException(new RuntimeException("Blocked potentially dangerous PHP function {$name}() being used as Twig function. If you really want to use it, please add it to system configuration: `system.twig.safe_functions`"));
        }

        return new TwigFunction($name, static function () {});
    }

    return false;
});

$this->twig->registerUndefinedFilterCallback(function (string $name) use ($config) {
    $allowed = $config->get('system.twig.safe_filters');
    if (is_array($allowed) && in_array($name, $allowed, true) && function_exists($name)) {
        return new TwigFilter($name, $name);
    }
    if ($config->get('system.twig.undefined_filters')) {
        if (function_exists($name)) {
            if (!Utils::isDangerousFunction($name)) {
                user_error("PHP function {$name}() used as Twig filter. This is deprecated in Grav 1.7. Please add it to system configuration: `system.twig.safe_filters`", E_USER_DEPRECATED);
                return new TwigFilter($name, $name);
            }
...

In the code above it can be seen that the calls of the "isDangerousFunction()" are not performed when the method/filter in the "$name" variable has been considered safe. A function can be defined safe only by an administrator user, by adding it into the configuration properties "system.twig.safe_functions" and/or "system.twig.safe_filters" (a sort of whitelists that by default are empty) of the configuration file "system/config/system.yaml".

It is to note that within the "system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php" file a Twig class is defined (with its constructor, methods and attributes) and in particular the Twig object (and environment) is instantiated on it:

/**
 * Class Twig
 * @package Grav\Common\Twig
 */
class Twig
{
    /** @var Environment */
    public $twig;
    /** @var array */
    public $twig_vars = [];
    /** @var array */
    public $twig_paths;
    /** @var string */
    public $template;
...
   /**
     * Constructor
     *
     * @param Grav $grav
     */
    public function __construct(Grav $grav)
    {
        $this->grav = $grav;
        $this->twig_paths = [];
    }

    /**
     * Twig initialization that sets the twig loader chain, then the environment, then extensions
     * and also the base set of twig vars
     *
     * @return $this
     */
    public function init()
    {
        if (null === $this->twig) {
            /** @var Config $config */
            $config = $this->grav['config'];
...

Since the security sandbox does not protect the Twig object it is possible to interact with it (e.g. call its methods, read/write its attributes) through opportunely crafted Twig template directives injected on a web page. Then an authenticated editor user could be able to add arbitrary functions into the Twig attributes "system.twig.safe_functions" and "system.twig.safe_filters" in order to circumvent the Grav CMS sandbox.

PoC

An authenticated user with the permissions to edit a page (having Twig processing enabled) on the Grav CMS admin console, could create/edit a web page containing a malicious template directive to execute arbitrary OS commands on the remote web server. For instance, in order to abuse the vulnerability and execute the prohibited "system('id')" code, bypassing the sandbox, the editor could generate a web page containing the following template directives:

{% set arr = {'1':'system', '2':'foo'} %}
{{ var_dump(grav.twig.twig_vars['config'].set('system.twig.safe_functions', arr)) }}
{{ system('id') }}

Once saved the malicious page could be accessed by unauthenticated users to execute the "system('id')" code on the remote server hosting the vulnerable Grav CMS.

Impact

It is possible to execute remote code on the underlying server and compromise it.

Tested version

Grav CMS v1.7.43

Reported by

Maurizio Siddu

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistgetgrav/gravall versions1.7.45
Exploits & PoCs
6

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for getgrav/grav. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update getgrav/grav to 1.7.45 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c9gp-64c4-2rrh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c9gp-64c4-2rrh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c9gp-64c4-2rrh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Grav CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which allows any authenticated user (editor permissions are sufficient) to execute arbitrary code on the remote server bypassing the existing security sandbox. ### Details The Grav CMS implements a custom sandbox to protect the powerful Twig methods "registerUndefinedFunctionCallback()" and "registerUndefinedFilterCallback()", in order to avoid SSTI attacks by denying the calling of dangerous PHP functions into the Twig template directives (such as: "exec()", "passthru()", "system()", etc.). The current defenses a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c9gp-64c4-2rrh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c9gp-64c4-2rrh across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.