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Saloon is vulnerable to SSRF and credential leakage via absolute URL in endpoint overriding base URLGHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp

GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp is a CWE-522 vulnerability in saloonphp/saloon. A fix is available for saloonphp/saloon — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-33182
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs37th percentile — riskier than 37% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.67%1.00%0.0%0.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘saloonphp/saloon

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Users providing user generated input into the resolveEndpoint method on requests.

Patches

Upgrade to Saloon v4+

Upgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4

Description

When building the request URL, Saloon combined the connector's base URL with the request endpoint. If the endpoint was a valid absolute URL (e.g. https://attacker.example.com/callback), the code used that URL as-is and ignored the base URL. The request—and any authentication headers, cookies, or tokens attached by the connector—was then sent to the attacker-controlled host. If the endpoint could be influenced by user input or configuration (e.g. redirect_uri, callback URL), this allowed server-side request forgery (SSRF) and/or credential leakage to a third-party host. The fix (in the next major version) is to reject absolute URLs in the endpoint: URLHelper::join() throws InvalidArgumentException when the endpoint is a valid absolute URL, unless explicitly allowed, requiring callers to opt-in to the functionality on a per-connector or per-request basis.

Credits

Saloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsaloonphp/saloonall versions4.0.0composer require saloonphp/saloon:^4.0.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
saloonsaloon
< 4.0.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for saloonphp/saloon, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update saloonphp/saloon to 4.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Users providing user generated input into the `resolveEndpoint` method on requests. ### Patches Upgrade to Saloon v4+ Upgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4 ### Description When building the request URL, Saloon combined the connector's base URL with the request endpoint. If the endpoint was a valid absolute URL (e.g. https://attacker.example.com/callback), the code used that URL as-is and ignored the base URL. The request—and any authentication headers, cookies, or tokens attached by the connector—was then sent to the attacker-controlled host. If t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Saloon is vulnerable to SSRF and credential leakage via…