Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🦀 crates.io

GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm

MEDIUM

rustix's `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosion

Also known asCVE-2024-43806
Published
Oct 18, 2023
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk38th percentile+0.40%
0.00%0.33%0.65%0.98%0.1%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🦀rustix🦀rustix🦀rustix🦀rustix

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When using rustix::fs::Dir using the linux_raw backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in rustix::fs::Dir::read_more, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application.

Details

Discovery

The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See this post and the Discord thread for details.

Diagnosis

This issue is caused by the combination of two independent bugs:

  1. Stuck iterator
  • The rustix::fs::Dir iterator can fail to halt after encountering an IO error, causing the caller to be stuck in an infinite loop.
  1. Memory over-allocation
  • Dir::read_more incorrectly grows the read buffer unconditionally each time it is called, regardless of necessity.

Since <Dir as Iterator>::next calls Dir::read, which in turn calls Dir::read_more, this means an IO error encountered during reading a directory can lead to rapid and unbounded growth of memory use.

PoC

fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
    // create a directory, get a FD to it, then unlink the directory but keep the FD
    std::fs::create_dir("tmp_dir")?;
    let dir_fd = rustix::fs::openat(
        rustix::fs::CWD,
        rustix::cstr!("tmp_dir"),
        rustix::fs::OFlags::RDONLY | rustix::fs::OFlags::CLOEXEC,
        rustix::fs::Mode::empty(),
    )?;
    std::fs::remove_dir("tmp_dir")?;

    // iterator gets stuck in infinite loop and memory explodes
    rustix::fs::Dir::read_from(dir_fd)?
        // the iterator keeps returning `Some(Err(_))`, but never halts by returning `None`
        // therefore if the implementation ignores the error (or otherwise continues
        // after seeing the error instead of breaking), the loop will not halt
        .filter_map(|dirent_maybe_error| dirent_maybe_error.ok())
        .for_each(|dirent| {
            // your happy path
            println!("{dirent:?}");
        });

    Ok(())
}

Impact

If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the Dir iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion.

As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. /proc, /sys) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using rustix::fs::Dir directly or indirectly (e.g. with the procfs crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors.

An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iorustix0.35.11&&< 0.35.150.35.15
🦀crates.iorustix0.36.0&&< 0.36.160.36.16
🦀crates.iorustix0.37.0&&< 0.37.250.37.25
🦀crates.iorustix0.38.0&&< 0.38.190.38.19

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for rustix. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update rustix to 0.35.15 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. ### Details #### Discovery The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See [this post](https://github.com/imsn
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.