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rustix's `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw` backend can cause memory explosionGHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm

MEDIUMFix: bytecodealliance/rustix@31fd98c

GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in rustix. A fix is available for rustix — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-43806
Published
Updated
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.65%0.98%0.1%0.5%May 26Aug 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected
🦀rustix🦀rustix🦀rustix🦀rustix

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When using rustix::fs::Dir using the linux_raw backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in rustix::fs::Dir::read_more, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application.

Details

Discovery

The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See this post and the Discord thread for details.

Diagnosis

This issue is caused by the combination of two independent bugs:

  1. Stuck iterator
  • The rustix::fs::Dir iterator can fail to halt after encountering an IO error, causing the caller to be stuck in an infinite loop.
  1. Memory over-allocation
  • Dir::read_more incorrectly grows the read buffer unconditionally each time it is called, regardless of necessity.

Since <Dir as Iterator>::next calls Dir::read, which in turn calls Dir::read_more, this means an IO error encountered during reading a directory can lead to rapid and unbounded growth of memory use.

PoC

fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
    // create a directory, get a FD to it, then unlink the directory but keep the FD
    std::fs::create_dir("tmp_dir")?;
    let dir_fd = rustix::fs::openat(
        rustix::fs::CWD,
        rustix::cstr!("tmp_dir"),
        rustix::fs::OFlags::RDONLY | rustix::fs::OFlags::CLOEXEC,
        rustix::fs::Mode::empty(),
    )?;
    std::fs::remove_dir("tmp_dir")?;

    // iterator gets stuck in infinite loop and memory explodes
    rustix::fs::Dir::read_from(dir_fd)?
        // the iterator keeps returning `Some(Err(_))`, but never halts by returning `None`
        // therefore if the implementation ignores the error (or otherwise continues
        // after seeing the error instead of breaking), the loop will not halt
        .filter_map(|dirent_maybe_error| dirent_maybe_error.ok())
        .for_each(|dirent| {
            // your happy path
            println!("{dirent:?}");
        });

    Ok(())
}

Impact

If a program tries to access a directory with its file descriptor after the file has been unlinked (or any other action that leaves the Dir iterator in the stuck state), and the implementation does not break after seeing an error, it can cause a memory explosion.

As an example, Linux's various virtual file systems (e.g. /proc, /sys) can contain directories that spontaneously pop in and out of existence. Attempting to iterate over them using rustix::fs::Dir directly or indirectly (e.g. with the procfs crate) can trigger this fault condition if the implementation decides to continue on errors.

An attacker knowledgeable about the implementation details of a vulnerable target can therefore try to trigger this fault condition via any one or a combination of several available APIs. If successful, the application host will quickly run out of memory, after which the application will likely be terminated by an OOM killer, leading to denial of service.

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iorustix≥ 0.35.11&&< 0.35.150.35.15cargo update -p rustix --precise 0.35.15
🦀crates.iorustix≥ 0.36.0&&< 0.36.160.36.16cargo update -p rustix --precise 0.36.16
🦀crates.iorustix≥ 0.37.0&&< 0.37.250.37.25cargo update -p rustix --precise 0.37.25
🦀crates.iorustix≥ 0.38.0&&< 0.38.190.38.19cargo update -p rustix --precise 0.38.19

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for rustix, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update rustix to 0.35.15 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c827-hfw6-qwvm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When using `rustix::fs::Dir` using the `linux_raw` backend, it's possible for the iterator to "get stuck" when an IO error is encountered. Combined with a memory over-allocation issue in `rustix::fs::Dir::read_more`, this can cause quick and unbounded memory explosion (gigabytes in a few seconds if used on a hot path) and eventually lead to an OOM crash of the application. ### Details #### Discovery The symptoms were initially discovered in https://github.com/imsnif/bandwhich/issues/284. That post has lots of details of our investigation. See [this post](https://github.com/imsn
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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rustix's `rustix::fs::Dir` iterator with the `linux_raw`…