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MEDIUM severity

gemini-bridge vulnerable to arbitrary local file read via consult_gemini_with_files inline modeGHSA-c5px-58j2-7fqp

MEDIUMFix: eLyiN/gemini-bridge#9

GHSA-c5px-58j2-7fqp is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.2) Path Traversal vulnerability in gemini-bridge. A fix is available for gemini-bridge — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-54785PYSEC-2026-3574
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 29, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c5px-58j2-7fqp.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs9th percentile — riskier than 9% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.69%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-c5px-58j2-7fqp by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 397,508 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍gemini-bridge

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

consult_gemini_with_files in inline mode read any file path supplied in the files argument without confining it to the working directory, then forwarded the contents to the Gemini CLI. Because the caller also controls query, the file contents are echoed back through the Gemini round-trip (and sent to Google), making this an arbitrary local file read.

Impact

An MCP client — or an LLM that has been prompt-injected into calling the tool — can read any file the server process can access (SSH keys, cloud credentials, .env, source) and have it disclosed via the tool response. No code execution by itself.

Affected component

  • Tool: consult_gemini_with_files(query, directory, files, …), mode="inline"
  • Sink: _read_file_for_inline via _prepare_inline_payload in src/mcp_server.py
  • The at_command mode already confined paths; inline mode did not.

Root cause

_resolve_path returned an out-of-root path while only nullifying the display name, and _prepare_inline_payload read the file regardless. Absolute paths, .. traversal, and symlink escapes were all accepted.

Patch

Fixed in 1.3.1. _resolve_path now resolves symlinks and confines via Path.relative_to(root); inline mode skips any entry that resolves outside the working directory (the same guard at_command already enforced).

Workarounds

Upgrade to 1.3.1. Before upgrading, avoid mode="inline" with untrusted files input, or run the server with a restricted-permission user.

Credit

Reported privately by Zhihao Zhang (WPI).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIgemini-bridge≥ 1.0.0&&< 1.3.11.3.1pip install --upgrade 'gemini-bridge==1.3.1'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gemini-bridge, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update gemini-bridge to 1.3.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c5px-58j2-7fqp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `consult_gemini_with_files` in **inline mode** read any file path supplied in the `files` argument without confining it to the working `directory`, then forwarded the contents to the Gemini CLI. Because the caller also controls `query`, the file contents are echoed back through the Gemini round-trip (and sent to Google), making this an arbitrary local file read. ### Impact An MCP client — or an LLM that has been prompt-injected into calling the tool — can read **any file the server process can access** (SSH keys, cloud credentials, `.env`, source) and have it disclosed via the too
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-c5px-58j2-7fqp: gemini-bridge — Fixed in 1.3.1