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GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82

GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in github.com/gohugoio/hugo. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Hugo: XSS via text/html content files

Also known asCVE-2026-50133GO-2026-5313
Published
Jun 16, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/gohugoio/hugo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Commit: e41a06447dDisallow HTML content by default Affected versions: all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. Fixed in: v0.162.0. Severity: Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under /content and every content adapter you load.

Description. Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the text/html media type (typically .html files under /content, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets content.mediaType = "text/html") had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source — for example, a CMS-backed editor, a content adapter pulling from an external API, or an automated import pipeline — could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting.

Mitigation. v0.162.0 introduces a security.allowContent whitelist with text/html denied by default. Sites that intentionally author HTML content can opt back in:

[security]
allowContent = ['.*']

This only affects pages whose source file (or content adapter output) declares an HTML media type; Markdown, AsciiDoc, Org, Pandoc and reStructuredText content is unaffected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/gohugoio/hugoall versions0.162.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gohugoio/hugo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/gohugoio/hugo to 0.162.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Commit:** [e41a06447d](https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/commit/e41a06447d) — _Disallow HTML content by default_ **Affected versions:** all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. **Fixed in:** v0.162.0. **Severity:** Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under `/content` and every content adapter you load. **Description.** Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the `text/html` media type (typically `.html` files under `/content`, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets `content.mediaType = "text/html"`) had thei
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.