How severe is GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82?

GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 affects the following packages: github.com/gohugoio/hugo (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82?

Update github.com/gohugoio/hugo to 0.162.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gohugoio/hugo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Is GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82?

GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 26th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82?

GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is classified as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) (CWE-79). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 was published on June 16, 2026 and was last updated on July 7, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

Hugo: XSS via text/html content filesGHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82

Fix: gohugoio/hugo@e41a064

GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in github.com/gohugoio/hugo. A fix is available for github.com/gohugoio/hugo — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-50133GO-2026-5313

Published

Jun 16, 2026

Updated

Jul 7, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Oct 29, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs26th percentile — riskier than 26% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/gohugoio/hugo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Commit: e41a06447d — Disallow HTML content by default Affected versions: all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. Fixed in: v0.162.0. Severity: Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under /content and every content adapter you load.

Description. Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the text/html media type (typically .html files under /content, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets content.mediaType = "text/html") had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source — for example, a CMS-backed editor, a content adapter pulling from an external API, or an automated import pipeline — could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting.

Mitigation. v0.162.0 introduces a security.allowContent whitelist with text/html denied by default. Sites that intentionally author HTML content can opt back in:

[security]
allowContent = ['.*']

This only affects pages whose source file (or content adapter output) declares an HTML media type; Markdown, AsciiDoc, Org, Pandoc and reStructuredText content is unaffected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/gohugoio/hugo`	all versions	0.162.0`go get github.com/gohugoio/hugo@v0.162.0`

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

hugogohugo

< 0.162.0

range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gohugoio/hugo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/gohugoio/hugo to 0.162.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

Product	Fixed in	Advisory
Red Hat Hardened Images	`hugo-main-0.163.3-0.1.hum1`	RHSA-2026:36862

Frequently Asked Questions

**Commit:** [e41a06447d](https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/commit/e41a06447d) — _Disallow HTML content by default_ **Affected versions:** all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. **Fixed in:** v0.162.0. **Severity:** Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under `/content` and every content adapter you load. **Description.** Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the `text/html` media type (typically `.html` files under `/content`, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets `content.mediaType = "text/html"`) had thei

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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