How severe is GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf?

GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf affects the following packages: gouef/githubtoplanguages (GitHub Actions). Ecosystems affected: GitHub Actions.

How do I fix GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf?

Update gouef/githubtoplanguages to 1.1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf in my GitHub Actions dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gouef/githubtoplanguages. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf was published on June 19, 2026 and was last updated on June 19, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 GitHub Actions

GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf

GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf is a remote code execution vulnerability in gouef/githubtoplanguages. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

githubtoplanguages: Command Injection via Issue Title in Discord Notification Workflow

Published

Jun 19, 2026

Updated

Jun 19, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

📦gouef/githubtoplanguages

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection through the issue title.

The workflow is triggered when an issue is opened or closed, and it directly inserts github.event.issue.title into a Bash variable assignment. If an issue title contains command substitution syntax, Bash evaluates it during the workflow run.

Details

The vulnerable workflow is:

.github/workflows/discord-issue.yml

The issue title is directly interpolated into a Bash script:

ISSUE_TITLE="${{ github.event.issue.title || github.event.pull_request.title }}"

Because GitHub Actions expressions are expanded before Bash executes the script, an attacker-controlled issue title containing command substitution syntax can be evaluated by the shell.

In the original workflow, the resulting value is then included in a Discord notification payload:

curl -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -X POST \
  -d "{\"username\": \"GitHub Bot\", \"content\": \"${STATUS} created by **${AUTHOR}**: **${ISSUE_TITLE}**\n🔗 ${ISSUE_URL}\"}" \
  "$DISCORD_WEBHOOK"

PoC

For safety, I reproduced this only in my fork. I did not trigger the original repository’s Discord webhook.

I kept the vulnerable Bash assignment unchanged and replaced the Discord webhook request with echo statements to observe the result safely.

Test issue title:

title: $(whoami)

Observed workflow log:

ISSUE_TITLE=title: runner

This confirms that $(whoami) was executed on the GitHub Actions runner before the value would be sent to Discord.

Impact

Any user who can open an issue may be able to execute shell commands on the GitHub Actions runner.

In practice, this means an attacker could create an issue with a crafted title, cause the workflow to execute a shell command, and have the command output included in the Discord notification content. This can be used to manipulate Discord notifications, spoof trusted GitHub bot messages, or repeatedly trigger unwanted notifications.

More importantly, the command runs in a workflow environment where a Discord webhook secret is configured. Depending on repository settings and workflow permissions, this may put workflow secrets or other environment data at risk.

Suggested Fix

Do not insert issue titles directly into Bash scripts.

Pass the title through an environment variable instead:

env:
  ISSUE_TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
run: |
  issue_title="$ISSUE_TITLE"

Also avoid eval, unquoted variable expansion, or shell execution patterns involving user-controlled issue content.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦GitHub Actions	`gouef/githubtoplanguages`	all versions	1.1.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gouef/githubtoplanguages. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gouef/githubtoplanguages to 1.1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection through the issue title. The workflow is triggered when an issue is opened or closed, and it directly inserts `github.event.issue.title` into a Bash variable assignment. If an issue title contains command substitution syntax, Bash evaluates it during the workflow run. ### Details The vulnerable workflow is: `.github/workflows/discord-issue.yml` The issue title is directly interpolated into a Bash script: ```bash ISSUE_TITLE="${{ github.event.issue.title || github.event.pull_request.title }}" ``` Because GitHub Ac

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c3xh-98xp-6qhf across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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