GHSA-9vj4-wc7r-p844
MEDIUMImageMagick MSL: Stack overflow via infinite recursion in ProcessMSLScript
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Magick.NET-Q8-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q8-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q8-x86.NETMagick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-x64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-arm64.NETMagick.NET-Q16-x86+10 moreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Stack overflow via infinite recursion in MSL (Magick Scripting Language) <write> command when writing to MSL format.
Version
- ImageMagick 7.x (tested on current main branch)
- Commit: HEAD
- Requires: libxml2 support (for MSL parsing)
Steps to Reproduce
Method 1: Using ImageMagick directly
magick MSL:recursive.msl out.png
Method 2: Using OSS-Fuzz reproduce
python3 infra/helper.py build_fuzzers imagemagick
python3 infra/helper.py reproduce imagemagick msl_fuzzer recursive.msl
Or run the fuzzer directly:
./msl_fuzzer recursive.msl
Expected Behavior
ImageMagick should handle recursive MSL references gracefully by detecting the loop and returning an error.
Actual Behavior
Stack overflow causes process crash:
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
==PID==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow
#0 MSLStartElement /src/imagemagick/coders/msl.c:7045
#1 xmlParseStartTag /src/libxml2/parser.c
#2 xmlParseChunk /src/libxml2/parser.c:11273
#3 ProcessMSLScript /src/imagemagick/coders/msl.c:7405
#4 WriteMSLImage /src/imagemagick/coders/msl.c:7867
#5 WriteImage /src/imagemagick/MagickCore/constitute.c:1346
#6 MSLStartElement /src/imagemagick/coders/msl.c:7045
... (infinite recursion, 287+ frames)
Root Cause Analysis
In coders/msl.c, the <write> command handler in MSLStartElement() (line ~7045) calls WriteImage(). When the output filename specifies MSL format (msl:filename), WriteMSLImage() is called, which parses the MSL file again via ProcessMSLScript().
If the MSL file references itself (directly or indirectly), this creates an infinite recursion loop:
MSLStartElement() → WriteImage() → WriteMSLImage() → ProcessMSLScript()
→ xmlParseChunk() → MSLStartElement() → ... (infinite loop)
Impact
- DoS: Guaranteed crash via stack exhaustion
- Affected: Any application using ImageMagick to process user-supplied MSL files
Additional Trigger Paths
The <read> command can also trigger recursion:
Indirect recursion is also possible (a.msl → b.msl → a.msl).
Fuzzer
This issue was discovered using a custom MSL fuzzer:
#include <cstdint>
#include <Magick++/Blob.h>
#include <Magick++/Image.h>
#include "utils.cc"
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size)
{
if (IsInvalidSize(Size))
return(0);
try
{
const Magick::Blob blob(Data, Size);
Magick::Image image;
image.magick("MSL");
image.fileName("MSL:");
image.read(blob);
}
catch (Magick::Exception)
{
}
return(0);
}
This issue was found by Team FuzzingBrain @ Texas A&M University
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-x64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-arm64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-x86 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
| .NETNuGet | Magick.NET-Q16-x64 | all versions | 14.10.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Magick.NET-Q8-x64. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update Magick.NET-Q8-x64 to 14.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9vj4-wc7r-p844 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9vj4-wc7r-p844 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-9vj4-wc7r-p844. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9vj4-wc7r-p844 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-9vj4-wc7r-p844 across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.