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MEDIUM severity

OpenClaw: Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopesGHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c

MEDIUM

GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.2) CWE-266 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-53862
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 30, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk-0.04%
Lower risk than most CVEs0th percentile — riskier than 0% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.21%0.42%0.63%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%Jul 26Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

132other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
openclawnpm
3.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes. In affected versions, a caller with access to a pending bootstrap token could reuse the token before approval with a broader requested scope set.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could present or retain broader pending pairing authority than intended. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.12.

Mitigations

treat pairing codes as sensitive and cancel unexpected pending pairings until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.5.12npm install openclaw@2026.5.12

Affected Products

1 product · 9 configurations
Application
openclawopenclaw
< 2026.5.12
1 version
2026.5.12

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.5.12 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes. In affected versions, a caller with access to a pending bootstrap token could reuse the token before approval with a broader requested scope set. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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