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GHSA-9r87-mvcw-x35f

HIGH

Coder vulnerable to OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching and email_verified bypass

Also known asCVE-2026-55075GO-2026-5908
Published
Jul 6, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk38th percentile0.00%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2🐹github.com/coder/coder/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the email_verified claim was only enforced when present as a boolean false so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified.

Impact

An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject.

Patches

The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults email_verified to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type.

The fix was backported to all supported release lines:

Release linePatched version
2.34v2.34.2
2.33v2.33.8
2.32v2.32.7
2.29 (ESR)v2.29.17

Workarounds

Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens.

Resources

  • Fix: #25712, #25713

Credits

Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/coder/coder/v22.34.0&&< 2.34.22.34.2
🐹Gogithub.com/coder/coder/v22.33.0&&< 2.33.82.33.8
🐹Gogithub.com/coder/coder/v22.30.0&&< 2.32.72.32.7
🐹Gogithub.com/coder/coder/v2all versions2.29.17

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/coder/coder/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.34.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9r87-mvcw-x35f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9r87-mvcw-x35f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-9r87-mvcw-x35f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, att
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-9r87-mvcw-x35f in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-9r87-mvcw-x35f across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.