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decidim-elections: Election question titles allow stored script executionGHSA-9mvp-w4rr-5c6x

MEDIUMFix: decidim/decidim#16659

GHSA-9mvp-w4rr-5c6x is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.8) Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in decidim-elections. A fix is available for decidim-elections — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-44282
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9mvp-w4rr-5c6x.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs32th percentile — riskier than 32% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.4%0.4%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-9mvp-w4rr-5c6x by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
💎decidim-elections

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

A low-privilege process-scoped admin who can manage elections can store arbitrary HTML in the question statement/body without sanitization, and the public elections UI renders that value unsafely.

Technical description

This stored XSS appears because election question titles are rendered as trusted HTML instead of sanitized text. The election question editor stores question.body as a normal translatable string, and the public helper question_title returns that value with html_safe and no sanitization boundary, so any user who can edit election questions can persist markup or script-bearing payloads that later render on public election pages.

<img width="1506" height="1285" alt="decidim-election-01" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2e17f396-10f9-4423-bb97-5badbdb20d21" /> <img width="1540" height="657" alt="decidim-election-02" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/178adb7b-d00e-4b5d-9237-f391e523973f" />

Impact

A low-privilege process-scoped admin or other election editor with question-management rights can persist JavaScript that executes in visitor's browsers on public election pages and voting booth screens.

Patches

See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16659

Workarounds

Developers should review their implementation's administrator accesses and not give access to untrustworthy users

Resources

OWASP XSS Injection

Credits

This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
💎RubyGemsdecidim-electionsall versions0.32.0bundle update decidim-elections --conservative

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-elections, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update decidim-elections to 0.32.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9mvp-w4rr-5c6x is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Description A low-privilege process-scoped admin who can manage elections can store arbitrary HTML in the question statement/body without sanitization, and the public elections UI renders that value unsafely. ## Technical description This stored XSS appears because election question titles are rendered as trusted HTML instead of sanitized text. The election question editor stores `question.body` as a normal translatable string, and the public helper `question_title` returns that value with `html_safe` and no sanitization boundary, so any user who can edit election questions can persist
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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