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GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v — gramps-webapi

GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v is a security vulnerability in gramps-webapi. A fix is available for gramps-webapi — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gramps Web API: Private Sub-Object Data in Non-Private Objects Exposed to Guest Users

Published
Apr 9, 2026
Updated
Apr 9, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Apr 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍gramps-webapi

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Users with the Guest role could receive private sub-object data (e.g. private alternate names, private addresses, private note/citation/media handles) through list API endpoints such as GET /api/people/, GET /api/places/, GET /api/events/, and all other object list endpoints.

This does not expose objects (people, places, events, …) that are themselves marked private. Top-level private objects are correctly excluded from all responses. Only sub-object data attached to otherwise-public objects is affected.

Affected Versions

All versions of Gramps Web API prior to the fix.

Root Cause

The vulnerability originates from the behaviour of PrivateProxyDb.iter_*() in Gramps core. The ProxyDbBase.__iter_object() helper, which backs all iter_*() methods in PrivateProxyDb, correctly filters out top-level private objects but returns the remaining objects unsanitized — i.e. without stripping private sub-object references. In contrast, PrivateProxyDb.get_*_from_handle() does call the appropriate sanitize_*() function.

Gramps Web API's ModifiedPrivateProxyDb (which wraps the raw database for non-admin users) inherited this behaviour without override.

The same issue affects Gramps desktop features that consume iter_*() output: reports and exports generated via Gramps desktop using PrivateProxyDb may also include private sub-object data that should have been stripped.

Conditions Required

This issue only affects trees in which sub-objects have been explicitly marked private in Gramps desktop. The Gramps Web frontend UI does not expose controls for setting the private flag on sub-objects (alternate names, addresses, notes, citations, media references, event references, etc.). In practice, such flags are set in Gramps desktop and then synced or imported into Gramps Web.

Impact

When the conditions above are met, a user with the Guest role querying any list endpoint receives:

  • Full content of private embedded sub-objects on people, such as alternate names (first name, surname, etc.) and addresses (street, city, etc.).
  • Handles referencing private notes, citations, and media attached to places, events, sources, and other objects. These reveal the existence of private linked objects but not their content; fetching those objects by handle is correctly blocked by the proxy.

Fix

ModifiedPrivateProxyDb now overrides all iter_*() object methods to check obj.get_privacy() directly on the already-loaded object (eliminating the redundant per-object refetch) and to call the appropriate sanitize_*() function before yielding each object. This is consistent with the behaviour of get_*_from_handle() in PrivateProxyDb.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIgramps-webapiall versions3.11.0pip install --upgrade 'gramps-webapi==3.11.0'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gramps-webapi, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update gramps-webapi to 3.11.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Users with the **Guest** role could receive private sub-object data (e.g. private alternate names, private addresses, private note/citation/media handles) through list API endpoints such as `GET /api/people/`, `GET /api/places/`, `GET /api/events/`, and all other object list endpoints. **This does not expose objects (people, places, events, …) that are themselves marked private.** Top-level private objects are correctly excluded from all responses. Only sub-object data attached to otherwise-public objects is affected. ## Affected Versions All versions of Gramps Web API prior to
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-9gjv-jvm7-vv2v: gramps-webapi | O3 Security