GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc — rancher
HIGHGHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Improper Authentication vulnerability in github.com/rancher/rancher. A fix is available for github.com/rancher/rancher — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Rancher does not automatically clean up a user deleted or disabled from the configured Authentication Provider
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/rancher/rancher🐹github.com/rancher/rancherReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
A vulnerability has been identified in which Rancher does not automatically clean up a user which has been deleted from the configured authentication provider (AP). This characteristic also applies to disabled or revoked users, Rancher will not reflect these modifications which may leave the user’s tokens still usable.
An AP must be enabled to be affected by this, as the built-in User Management feature is not affected by this vulnerability. This issue may lead to an adversary gaining unauthorized access, as the user’s access privileges may still be active within Rancher even though they are no longer valid on the configured AP (please consult the MITRE ATT&CK - Technique - Valid Accounts for further information about the associated technique of attack).
It’s important to note that all configurable APs are impacted, see Rancher Docs - Configuring Authentication - External vs. Local Authentication to get the full authentication providers list.
To address this issue, the fix introduces a new user retention process that can be configured to run periodically and disable and/or delete inactive users. If enabled a user becomes subject to retention if they don't login for a configurable period of time. It's possible to set overrides for users that are used mainly for programmatic access (e.g. CI, scripts etc.) so that they don't become subject to retention for a longer period of time or at all. The user retention process is disabled by default, to avoid deleting wrong accounts. It is up to each user to enable it and configure the retention period as it best suits its environment.
Be aware that once the process is enabled, it might take a few days for previous users that have been revoked or deleted from the AP to be automatically removed from Rancher. To attenuate the risk of this condition, we recommend to regularly audit the AP’s user accounts for activity and manually deactivate or remove them from Rancher, if they are no longer needed.
For further information about the user retention process configuration, please refer to the dedicated documentation Rancher Docs - Advanced User Guides - Enable User Retention.
Patches
Patched versions include releases 2.7.14 and 2.8.5.
Workarounds
Administrators that are unable to update to a patched Rancher Manager version, are advised to delete Rancher users, via kubectl or through the UI, as soon as those users are deleted from the Authentication Provider. If a user needs to be temporarily disabled on the Authentication Provider, similar intervention will need to take place to reflect that change on Rancher Manager.
Below is a procedure to list and remove a deleted/disabled user in Rancher using kubectl (with a privileged kubeconfig).
- List all users bound to a supported external auth provider, then returns
username,uid,displayNameandPrincipalIdswhich contains the relatedauthprovider_user://ID
#!/bin/bash
for authprovider in {activedirectory,azure,common,genericoidc,github googleauth, keycloakoidc,ldap,oidc,publicapi,saml}
do
kubectl get users -o json | jq --arg authprovider "$authprovider" '.items[] | select(.principalIds[] | test("^" + $authprovider + "_user://")) | {username: .metadata.name, uid: .metadata.uid, displayName: .displayName, principalIds: .principalIds}'
done
- Once the
authprovider_user://ID(and/orDisplayName) is confirmed, remove the user from the Rancher UI or usingkubectl delete users <USERNAME>.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the Rancher repository.
- Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | ≥ 2.7.0&&< 2.7.14 | 2.7.14go get github.com/rancher/rancher@v2.7.14 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/rancher/rancher | ≥ 2.8.0&&< 2.8.5 | 2.8.5go get github.com/rancher/rancher@v2.8.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/rancher/rancher, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/rancher/rancher to 2.7.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-9ghh-mmcq-8phc across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.