NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🦀 crates.io
Not in CISA KEV

A malicious coder can get unsound access to TCell or TLCell memoryGHSA-9c9f-7x9p-4wqp

GHSA-9c9f-7x9p-4wqp is a security vulnerability in qcell. A fix is available for qcell — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asRUSTSEC-2022-0007
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2023 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀qcell

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

This is impossible to do by accident, but by carefully constructing marker types to be covariant, a malicious coder can cheat the singleton check in TCellOwner and TLCellOwner, giving unsound access to cell memory. This could take the form of getting two mutable references to the same memory, or a mutable reference and an immutable reference.

The fix is for the crate to internally force the marker type to be invariant. This blocks the conversion between covariant types which Rust normally allows.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.ioqcellall versions0.4.3cargo update -p qcell --precise 0.4.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for qcell, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update qcell to 0.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9c9f-7x9p-4wqp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

This is impossible to do by accident, but by carefully constructing marker types to be covariant, a malicious coder can cheat the singleton check in `TCellOwner` and `TLCellOwner`, giving unsound access to cell memory. This could take the form of getting two mutable references to the same memory, or a mutable reference and an immutable reference. The fix is for the crate to internally force the marker type to be invariant. This blocks the conversion between covariant types which Rust normally allows.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-9c9f-7x9p-4wqp in your dependencies?

Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.

A malicious coder can get unsound access to TCell or…