NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

Minder's GitHub Webhook Handler vulnerable to DoS from un-validated requestsGHSA-9c5w-9q3f-3hv7

HIGHFix: stacklok/minder@3e5a527

GHSA-9c5w-9q3f-3hv7 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in github.com/stacklok/minder. A fix is available for github.com/stacklok/minder — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2024-34084GO-2024-2821
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-9c5w-9q3f-3hv7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs49th percentile — riskier than 49% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.36%0.73%1.09%0.1%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/stacklok/minder

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Minder's HandleGithubWebhook is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists before the request has been validated, and as such the request is still untrusted at the point of failure. This allows an attacker with the ability to send requests to HandleGithubWebhook to crash the Minder controlplane and deny other users from using it.

One of the first things that HandleGithubWebhook does is to validate the payload signature. This is done by way of the internal helper validatePayloadSignature:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks.go#L213-L218

validatePayloadSignature generates a reader from the incoming request by way of the internal helper readerFromRequest:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks.go#L337-L342

To create a reader from the incoming request, readerFromRequest first reads the request body entirely into memory on line 368:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks.go#L367-L377

This is a vulnerability, since an HTTP request with a large body can exhaust the memory of the machine running Minder and cause the Go runtime to crash Minder.

Note that this occurs before Minder has validated the request, and as such, the request is still untrusted.

To test this out, we can use the existing TestHandleWebHookRepository unit test and modify the HTTP request body to be large.

To do that, change these lines:

https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/ee66f6c0763212503c898cfefb65ce1450c7f5ac/internal/controlplane/handlers_githubwebhooks_test.go#L278-L283

... to these lines:

	packageJson, err := json.Marshal(event)
	require.NoError(t, err, "failed to marshal package event")

        maliciousBody := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("1337", 1000000000))
        maliciousBodyReader := io.MultiReader(maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody)
        _ = packageJson

	client := &http.Client{}
	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", addr), maliciousBodyReader)
	require.NoError(t, err, "failed to create request")

Then run the unit test again. WARNING, SAVE ALL WORK BEFORE DOING THIS.

On my local machine, this causes the machine to freeze, and Go finally performs a sigkill:

signal: killed
FAIL      github.com/stacklok/minder/internal/controlplane          30.759s
FAIL

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/stacklok/minderall versions0.0.48go get github.com/stacklok/minder@v0.0.48

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/stacklok/minder, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/stacklok/minder to 0.0.48 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-9c5w-9q3f-3hv7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

Minder's `HandleGithubWebhook` is susceptible to a denial of service attack from an untrusted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists before the request has been validated, and as such the request is still untrusted at the point of failure. This allows an attacker with the ability to send requests to `HandleGithubWebhook` to crash the Minder controlplane and deny other users from using it. One of the first things that `HandleGithubWebhook` does is to validate the payload signature. This is done by way of the internal helper `validatePayloadSignature`: https://github.com/stacklok/minder/blob/e
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-9c5w-9q3f-3hv7 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

Minder's GitHub Webhook Handler vulnerable to DoS…