GHSA-995v-fvrw-c78m
opentelemetry-go's Schema ParseFile leaks file descriptors on each parse
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1🐹go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.0Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.0 and go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1 leaks one file descriptor on each successful ParseFile call. ParseFile opens the schema file and passes it to Parse without closing it; repeated parsing in a long-running process can exhaust the process file descriptor limit and cause denial of service. The severity is low because exploitation depends on a consuming application exposing repeated schema parsing to an attacker-controlled path.
Introduced in commit: e72a235
Details
In schema/v1.0/parser.go:41-47, ParseFile opens the requested schema path with os.Open and then returns Parse(file) without a defer file.Close() or other close path:
file, err := os.Open(schemaFilePath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return Parse(file)
The validation evidence also identifies schema/v1.0/parser.go:50-73: Parse accepts an io.Reader, decodes from it, and does not close it. Ownership of the opened file is therefore not transferred to Parse, leaving the descriptor open until the Go runtime eventually finalizes the file object. With repeated ParseFile calls, descriptors can accumulate until the process receives EMFILE / "too many open files".
PoC
The local artifact validation-artifact.zip contains:
leak_poc.go: PoC source that repeatedly callsschema.ParseFile("schema/v1.0/testdata/valid-example.yaml")and prints/proc/self/fdcounts.LEAK_POC_README.txt: reproduction notes.leak_poc_run.log: captured attempted run; the local offline environment failed before execution because Go module download fromproxy.golang.orgwas forbidden.
Reproduce from the root of a checkout of pellared/opentelemetry-go at commit e72a235 with Go module dependencies already available:
/bin/sh -c 'ulimit -n 256; GOGC=off go run leak_poc.go'
Configuration:
- File descriptor soft limit:
256 - Garbage collection: disabled with
GOGC=offso leaked descriptors are not reclaimed during the loop - Schema file:
schema/v1.0/testdata/valid-example.yaml
Expected output is increasing descriptor counts followed by an EMFILE failure, for example:
iter 0 fds 7
iter 50 fds 57
iter 100 fds 107
...
panic: iteration 248: open schema/v1.0/testdata/valid-example.yaml: too many open files
The exact initial descriptor count and failing iteration can vary by OS and process state.
Impact
This is a file descriptor resource leak leading to availability loss. Applications that call schema.ParseFile repeatedly, especially through a runtime reload or request-controlled path, can exhaust their process file descriptor table and fail subsequent file, socket, or other descriptor operations. Impact is limited to denial of service of the consuming process; the evidence does not show confidentiality or integrity impact.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1 | all versions | 0.0.17 |
| 🐹Go | go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.0 | all versions | 0.0.17 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update go.opentelemetry.io/otel/schema/v1.1 to 0.0.17 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-995v-fvrw-c78m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-995v-fvrw-c78m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-995v-fvrw-c78m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-995v-fvrw-c78m in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-995v-fvrw-c78m across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.