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MEDIUM severity

melange has Path Traversal When Resolving External Pipelines via Unvalidated pipeline[].usesGHSA-98f2-w9h9-7fp9

MEDIUMFix: chainguard-dev/melange@5829ca4

GHSA-98f2-w9h9-7fp9 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) Path Traversal vulnerability in chainguard.dev/melange. A fix is available for chainguard.dev/melange — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-29050GO-2026-5279
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-98f2-w9h9-7fp9.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs3th percentile — riskier than 3% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.45%0.68%0.0%0.1%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹chainguard.dev/melange

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

An attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set pipeline[].uses to a value containing ../ sequences or an absolute path. The (*Compiled).compilePipeline function in pkg/build/compile.go passed uses directly to filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml") without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each --pipeline-dir and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its runs: block is executed via /bin/sh -c in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition.

Patches

Fixed in melange v0.43.4 via commit 5829ca4. The fix rejects uses values that are absolute paths or contain .., and verifies (via filepath.Rel after filepath.Clean) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory.

Workarounds

Only run melange build against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of pipeline[].uses values and reject any containing .. or leading /.

Credits

melange thanks Oleh Konko (@1seal from 1seal.org) for discovering and reporting this issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gochainguard.dev/melange≥ 0.32.0&&< 0.43.40.43.4go get chainguard.dev/melange@v0.43.4

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
melangechainguard
≥ 0.32.0 && < 0.43.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for chainguard.dev/melange, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update chainguard.dev/melange to 0.43.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-98f2-w9h9-7fp9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact An attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set `pipeline[].uses` to a value containing `../` sequences or an absolute path. The `(*Compiled).compilePipeline` function in `pkg/build/compile.go` passed `uses` directly to `filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml")` without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each `--pipeline-dir` and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melang
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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