zip Incorrectly Canonicalizes Paths during Archive Extraction Leading to Arbitrary File WriteGHSA-94vh-gphv-8pm8
Fix: zip-rs/zip2@a2e062fGHSA-94vh-gphv-8pm8 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in zip. A fix is available for zip — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-94vh-gphv-8pm8.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
zipReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In the archive extraction routine of affected versions of the zip crate, symbolic links earlier in the archive are allowed to be used for later files in the archive without validation of the final canonicalized path, allowing maliciously crafted archives to overwrite arbitrary files in the file system when extracted.
Details
This is a variant of the zip-slip vulnerability, we can make the extraction logic step outside of the target directory by creating a symlink to the parent directory and then extracting further files through that symlink.
The documentation of the [::zip::read::ZipArchive::extract] method is in my opinion implying this should not happen:
"Paths are sanitized with ZipFile::enclosed_name." ... [
::zip::read::FileOptions::enclosed_name] ... is resistant to path-based exploits ... can’t resolve to a path outside the current directory.
Most archive software either decline to extract symlinks that traverse out of the directory or defer creation of symlinks after all files have been created to prevent unexpected behavior when later entries depend on earlier symbolic link entries.
PoC
https://gist.github.com/eternal-flame-AD/bf71ef4f6828e741eb12ce7fd47b7b85
Impact
Users who extract untrusted archive files using the following high-level API method may be affected and critical files on the system may be overwritten with arbitrary file permissions, which can potentially lead to code execution.
- zip::unstable::stream::ZipStreamReader::extract
- zip::read::ZipArchive::extract
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | zip | ≥ 1.3.0&&< 2.3.0 | 2.3.0cargo update -p zip --precise 2.3.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for zip, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update zip to 2.3.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-94vh-gphv-8pm8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-94vh-gphv-8pm8 in your dependencies?
Find it across crates.io, including transitive dependencies.