How severe is GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9?

GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 affects the following packages: openclaw (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9?

Update openclaw to 2026.3.24 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9?

GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is classified as CWE-862 (CWE-862). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 was published on March 30, 2026 and was last updated on April 10, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9

GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is a CWE-862 vulnerability in openclaw. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OpenClaw: Gateway operator.write Can Reach Admin-Class Channel Allowlist Persistence via chat.send

Also known asCVE-2026-35621

Published

Mar 30, 2026

Updated

Apr 10, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

139other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream

openclawnpm

3.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.

Summary

The shared /allowlist command persists channel authorization config through writeConfigFile(...) but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because chat.send is intentionally reachable to operator.write callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy that direct config.patch correctly reserves to operator.admin.

This is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared /config and /plugins writes, but /allowlist was left behind.

Details

The gateway's documented scope split is clear:

chat.send is a write-scoped action.
direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.

The vulnerable path is:

A gateway client authenticates with operator.write.
The client calls chat.send, which is intentionally allowed for that scope.
chat.send builds an internal message context with CommandAuthorized: true and carries GatewayClientScopes into the reply pipeline.
resolveCommandAuthorization(...) converts that internal message into isAuthorizedSender=true in the common case where no stricter commands.allowFrom override is configured.
/allowlist add|remove accepts that generic command authorization and proceeds into its config-backed edit path.
The handler clones the parsed config, calls plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...), validates the result, and persists it with writeConfigFile(validated.config).
No sink-side check requires operator.admin before the persistent write occurs.

That creates a direct control-plane mismatch:

config.patch rejects the same caller with missing scope: operator.admin.
/allowlist add dm ... or /allowlist add group ... reached through chat.send can still rewrite channel authorization state.

Impact

A gateway client intentionally limited to operator.write can persist first-party channel authorization policy.
The caller can widen DM or group allowlists for channels using the shared /allowlist plumbing.
This weakens the repo's documented control-plane privilege split between ordinary write actions and admin-only persistent authorization mutation.

Remediation

1) Add the Missing Sink-Side Internal Admin Check to `/allowlist`

Mirror the existing hardened pattern from /config and /plugins.

Before any config-backed /allowlist add|remove write, require:

operator.admin for internal gateway channels

This should happen before plugin.allowlist.applyConfigEdit(...) and before writeConfigFile(...).

2) Keep Pairing-Store and Config-Write Policy Checks, but Do Not Treat Them as Scope Enforcement

configWrites policy and pairing-store behavior are useful secondary controls, but they do not replace the missing privilege check between operator.write and operator.admin.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`openclaw`	all versions	2026.3.24

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.3.24 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-94pw-c6m8-p9p9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

> Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release. ## Summary The shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`. This is not just a generi

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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