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symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtilGHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh

Fix: symfony/ux@725ab3d

GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh is a Information Exposure vulnerability in symfony/ux-autocomplete. A fix is available for symfony/ux-autocomplete — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-49211
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.69%1.03%0.3%0.5%0.5%0.5%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐘symfony/ux-autocomplete🐘symfony/ux-autocomplete

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause() builds the LIKE expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in %...% without escaping the SQL LIKE wildcards (%, _, \). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send % to match every row or use _ as a single-character wildcard.

Because searchable_fields defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (BaseEntityAutocompleteType ships with security => false), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.

Resolution

EntitySearchUtil now escapes \, %, and _ in the user-supplied query with addcslashes() and appends an explicit ESCAPE '\' clause to the generated LIKE expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match words_query IN() branch is unchanged.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsymfony/ux-autocomplete≥ 2.2.0&&< 2.36.02.36.0composer require symfony/ux-autocomplete:^2.36.0
🐘Packagistsymfony/ux-autocomplete≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.1.03.1.0composer require symfony/ux-autocomplete:^3.1.0

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
uxsymfony
≥ 2.2.0 && < 2.36.0
1 version
3.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for symfony/ux-autocomplete, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update symfony/ux-autocomplete to 2.36.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Until you can upgrade, make sure every query built from user input uses parameterised statements or a prepared-statement API rather than string concatenation, and reduce the database account's privileges so an injected query cannot read or alter data beyond what the feature needs.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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