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📦 npm

GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh

HIGH

OpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval

Published
Mar 2, 2026
Updated
Mar 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
3.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (POST /tools/invoke) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments:

  • The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like sessions_spawn / sessions_send and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions.
  • ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation.

Impact

If the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to:

  • Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment.
  • Perform cross-session message injection via sessions_send.
  • In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions.

CVSS

  • CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8)

Affected versions

  • openclaw < 2026.2.14

Fixed in

  • openclaw >= 2026.2.14

Remediation

The default behavior is now hardened:

  • PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP /tools/invoke by default (with gateway.tools.{allow,deny} overrides) and harden ACP permission handling.
  • Commit bb1c3dfe1: ACP clients now prompt for any non-read/search permission request (fail closed for mutating/execution/fetch operations).
  • Commit 539689a2f: security audit warns when gateway.tools.allow re-enables default-denied HTTP tools, since this can increase RCE blast radius if the Gateway is reachable.
  • Commit 153a7644e: ACP safe-kind inference is stricter to avoid accidental auto-approval due to substring matches (still auto-approves only confident read/search).

Mitigations / deployment guidance

  • Keep the Gateway loopback-only unless you have a strong reason not to: gateway.bind="loopback" / openclaw gateway run --bind loopback.
  • Avoid exposing the Gateway directly to the public internet. Use an SSH tunnel or Tailscale to access a loopback-bound Gateway.
  • Treat opting in to default-denied HTTP tools (via gateway.tools.allow) as high-risk and audit such configurations carefully.

Credits

OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting this issue and contributing remediation work.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (`POST /tools/invoke`) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments: - The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like `sessions_spawn` / `sessions_send` and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions. - ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, re
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.