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HIGH severity

GovernorCompatibilityBravo may trim proposal calldataGHSA-93hq-5wgc-jc82

HIGHFix: OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@8d633cb

GHSA-93hq-5wgc-jc82 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in @openzeppelin/contracts. A fix is available for @openzeppelin/contracts — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2023-30542
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 12, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-93hq-5wgc-jc82.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs48th percentile — riskier than 48% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.03%0.38%0.73%1.08%0.5%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%May 26Jul 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

4Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@openzeppelin/contractsnpm
1.4Mdownloads / week
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeablenpm
427Kdownloads / week

Description

OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for secure smart contract development. The proposal creation entrypoint (propose) in GovernorCompatibilityBravo allows the creation of proposals with a signatures array shorter than the calldatas array. This causes the additional elements of the latter to be ignored, and if the proposal succeeds the corresponding actions would eventually execute without any calldata. The ProposalCreated event correctly represents what will eventually execute, but the proposal parameters as queried through getActions appear to respect the original intended calldata. This issue has been patched in 4.8.3. As a workaround, ensure that all proposals that pass through governance have equal length signatures and calldatas parameters.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@openzeppelin/contracts≥ 4.3.0&&< 4.8.34.8.3npm install @openzeppelin/contracts@4.8.3
📦npm@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable≥ 4.3.0&&< 4.8.34.8.3npm install @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable@4.8.3

Affected Products

2 products · 2 configurations
Application
contractsopenzeppelin
≥ 4.3.0 && < 4.8.3
range
Application
contracts upgradeableopenzeppelin
≥ 4.3.0 && < 4.8.3
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @openzeppelin/contracts, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @openzeppelin/contracts to 4.8.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-93hq-5wgc-jc82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The proposal creation entrypoint (`propose`) in `GovernorCompatibilityBravo` allows the creation of proposals with a `signatures` array shorter than the `calldatas` array. This causes the additional elements of the latter to be ignored, and if the proposal succeeds the corresponding actions would eventually execute without any calldata. The `ProposalCreated` event correctly represents what will eventually execute, but the proposal parameters as queried through `getActions` appear to respect the original intended calldata. ### Patches This issue has been patched in v4.8.3. ### Wo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GovernorCompatibilityBravo may trim proposal calldata