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GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f

MEDIUM

Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash Exposure

Also known asCVE-2026-48009
Published
Jun 4, 2026
Updated
Jun 4, 2026
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk19th percentile0.00%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

4 pkgs affected
🐘shopware/platform🐘shopware/platform🐘shopware/core🐘shopware/core

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A low-privilege admin user with user_recovery:read ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.

OWASP: A01:2021 — Broken Access Control

Root Cause

The user_recovery entity exposes its hash field through the Admin API search endpoint (POST /api/search/user-recovery). The hash field lacks ApiAware(false) or ReadProtection, so any user with user_recovery:read ACL can read it.

The password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.

Three endpoints combine to form the attack:

  1. POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery — triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (no auth required)
  2. POST /api/search/user-recovery — reads the hash (requires only user_recovery:read ACL)
  3. PATCH /api/_action/user/user-recovery/password — resets password using hash (no auth required)

Vulnerable code:

  • src/Core/System/User/Recovery/UserRecoveryDefinition.phphash field is ApiAware with no ReadProtection

Impact

  • Full admin account takeover — attacker gains the highest privilege level in the system
  • All admin capabilities — user/role management, system configuration, plugin management, customer data access
  • Cascading compromise — taken-over admin account can be used to pivot to other attacks
  • Low barrieruser_recovery:read is a seemingly harmless permission that grants devastating access

Remediation

Remove the hash field from API responses:

// src/Core/System/User/Recovery/UserRecoveryDefinition.php
(new StringField('hash', 'hash'))
    ->addFlags(new Required(), new ApiAware(false)),

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistshopware/platform6.7.0.0&&< 6.7.10.16.7.10.1
🐘Packagistshopware/platformall versions6.6.10.18
🐘Packagistshopware/core6.7.0.0&&< 6.7.10.16.7.10.1
🐘Packagistshopware/coreall versions6.6.10.18

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for shopware/platform. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update shopware/platform to 6.7.10.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A low-privilege admin user with `user_recovery:read` ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API. **OWASP:** A01:2021 — Broken Access Control ## Root Cause The `user_recovery` entity exposes its `hash` field through the Admin API sea
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.