Shopware: Admin Account Takeover via User Recovery Hash ExposureGHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f
MEDIUMGHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.8) Information Exposure vulnerability in shopware/platform. A fix is available for shopware/platform — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 390,400 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
shopware/platform🐘shopware/platform🐘shopware/core🐘shopware/coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A low-privilege admin user with user_recovery:read ACL can take over any admin account. The attacker triggers password recovery for the victim (unauthenticated endpoint), reads the recovery hash from the Admin API search endpoint, then uses the hash to reset the victim's password (another unauthenticated endpoint). The recovery hash — intended to be secret and delivered only via email — is fully readable through the standard entity search API.
OWASP: A01:2021 — Broken Access Control
Root Cause
The user_recovery entity exposes its hash field through the Admin API search endpoint (POST /api/search/user-recovery). The hash field lacks ApiAware(false) or ReadProtection, so any user with user_recovery:read ACL can read it.
The password recovery flow assumes the hash is delivered exclusively via email. The Admin API provides an alternative channel to obtain it, breaking this assumption.
Three endpoints combine to form the attack:
POST /api/_action/user/user-recovery— triggers recovery, creates hash in DB (no auth required)POST /api/search/user-recovery— reads the hash (requires onlyuser_recovery:readACL)PATCH /api/_action/user/user-recovery/password— resets password using hash (no auth required)
Vulnerable code:
src/Core/System/User/Recovery/UserRecoveryDefinition.php—hashfield isApiAwarewith noReadProtection
Impact
- Full admin account takeover — attacker gains the highest privilege level in the system
- All admin capabilities — user/role management, system configuration, plugin management, customer data access
- Cascading compromise — taken-over admin account can be used to pivot to other attacks
- Low barrier —
user_recovery:readis a seemingly harmless permission that grants devastating access
Remediation
Remove the hash field from API responses:
// src/Core/System/User/Recovery/UserRecoveryDefinition.php
(new StringField('hash', 'hash'))
->addFlags(new Required(), new ApiAware(false)),
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | shopware/platform | ≥ 6.7.0.0&&< 6.7.10.1 | 6.7.10.1composer require shopware/platform:^6.7.10.1 |
| 🐘Packagist | shopware/platform | all versions | 6.6.10.18composer require shopware/platform:^6.6.10.18 |
| 🐘Packagist | shopware/core | ≥ 6.7.0.0&&< 6.7.10.1 | 6.7.10.1composer require shopware/core:^6.7.10.1 |
| 🐘Packagist | shopware/core | all versions | 6.6.10.18composer require shopware/core:^6.6.10.18 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for shopware/platform, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update shopware/platform to 6.7.10.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8v9p-g828-v98f in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.