Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV

GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8

Fix: openpgpjs/openpgpjs@43f5f4e

GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8 is a CWE-347 vulnerability in openpgp. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed

Also known asCVE-2025-47934
Published
May 19, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Feb 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.

openpgpnpm
1.1Mdownloads / week

Description

Impact

A maliciously modified message can be passed to either openpgp.verify or openpgp.decrypt, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.

This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using openpgp.verify) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using openpgp.decrypt with verificationKeys) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.

In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.

In other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature.

Both OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.

Patches

The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.

Workarounds

  • When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by openpgp.readMessage, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using openpgp.createMessage) to openpgp.verify.
  • When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling openpgp.decrypt without verificationKeys, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using openpgp.createMessage) to openpgp.verify.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank:

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenpgp5.0.1&&< 5.11.35.11.3
📦npmopenpgp6.0.0-alpha.0&&< 6.1.16.1.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openpgp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openpgp to 5.11.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact A maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed da
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8: OpenPGP.js's message… | O3 Security