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Claude Code Action: Malicious MCP Server Configuration in PRs Enables Remote Code Execution and Secret ExfiltrationGHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q

Fix: anthropics/claude-code-action#1066

GHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q is a OS Command Injection vulnerability in anthropics/claude-code-action. A fix is available for anthropics/claude-code-action — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-47751
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.06%0.46%0.86%1.27%0.6%0.8%0.8%0.8%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦anthropics/claude-code-action

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Due to the combination of checking out PR head branches (attacker-controlled), reading .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabling all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, it was possible for an attacker who opened a PR containing a malicious .mcp.json file to achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner. This could lead to exfiltration of secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user triggered the Claude action on the PR. Exploiting this required the ability to open a pull request against a repository using the claude-code-action and a privileged user or automatic trigger to invoke the action on that PR.

Users pinned to a vulnerable version of claude-code-action are advised to update to the latest version. Users referencing anthropics/claude-code-action@v1, anthropics/claude-code-action@beta, anthropics/claude-code-action@main, or other non-pinned tags will have received this fix already

Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/reptou for reporting this issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionsanthropics/claude-code-actionall versions1.0.74

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for anthropics/claude-code-action, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update anthropics/claude-code-action to 1.0.74 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8q5r-mmjf-575q is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

Due to the combination of checking out PR head branches (attacker-controlled), reading `.mcp.json` from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabling all project MCP servers via `enableAllProjectMcpServers`, it was possible for an attacker who opened a PR containing a malicious `.mcp.json` file to achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner. This could lead to exfiltration of secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user triggered the Claude action on the PR. Exploiting this required the ability to ope
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Claude Code Action: Malicious MCP Server Configuration…