GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in vllm. A fix is available for vllm — see the affected versions and patch details below.
vLLM: Request-selected PyNvVideoCodec GPU decode bypasses static VRAM reservation
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 374,847 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
vllmReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Current vLLM main lets an inference request choose the PyNvVideoCodec GPU video decoder through media_io_kwargs.video.video_backend, but engine GPU memory reservation is computed only from static startup configuration and VLLM_VIDEO_LOADER_BACKEND. If the server starts with the default OpenCV/software backend and no --mm-ipc-gpu-memory-gb budget, a client can still route a video request into the PyNvVideoCodec path after startup, causing frontend CUDA-context, decoder-surface, and decoded-frame GPU allocations that were not carved out of the engine KV-cache budget.
Technical Details
The vulnerable boundary is the split between request-time media decoding choices in the API server and startup-time memory budgeting in the engine worker. Request bodies for Chat Completions and Responses expose media_io_kwargs, and those values are forwarded to the shared media connector. For video inputs, MediaConnector.fetch_video() copies self.media_io_kwargs["video"] into video_io_kwargs, only setting a model-derived backend when video_backend is absent. VideoMediaIO.__init__() then consumes video_backend from those kwargs and loads that backend from VIDEO_LOADER_REGISTRY.
The relevant request-side source path is:
video_io_kwargs = dict(self.media_io_kwargs.get("video", {}))
if "video_backend" not in video_io_kwargs and (
video_backend := get_video_loader_backend_for_processor(video_processor)
):
video_io_kwargs["video_backend"] = video_backend
video_io = VideoMediaIO(image_io, **video_io_kwargs)
video_loader_backend = (
kwargs.pop("video_backend", None) or envs.VLLM_VIDEO_LOADER_BACKEND
)
self.video_loader = VIDEO_LOADER_REGISTRY.load(video_loader_backend)
VideoBackend.load_bytes() then dispatches backend == "pynvvideocodec" into decode_frames_pynvvideocodec(), which constructs a PyNvVideoCodec decoder, creates or uses a CUDA stream, reads stream metadata, decodes selected frames on the GPU, and copies those frames into pinned host memory. The new frontend GPU memory pool accounts only for raw decoded frame bytes when a pool exists; it does not make request-time backend selection safe when no startup reservation was made.
The engine-side reservation code makes its decision from static model config and environment only:
def _uses_pynvvideocodec_video_backend(mm_config) -> bool:
video_kwargs = mm_config.media_io_kwargs.get("video", {})
video_loader_backend = (
video_kwargs.get("video_backend") or envs.VLLM_VIDEO_LOADER_BACKEND
)
codec_backend = video_kwargs.get("backend")
return (
video_loader_backend == PYNVVIDEOCODEC_VIDEO_BACKEND
or codec_backend == PYNVVIDEOCODEC_VIDEO_BACKEND
)
decoder_reserved_bytes = (
num_api_servers * per_server_decoder_bytes
if self._uses_pynvvideocodec_video_backend(mm_config)
else 0
)
reserved_bytes = raw_frame_reserved_bytes + decoder_reserved_bytes
if reserved_bytes <= 0:
return available_kv_cache_memory_bytes
With default static video configuration, mm_config.media_io_kwargs["video"] does not name PyNvVideoCodec and VLLM_VIDEO_LOADER_BACKEND defaults to OpenCV/software decoding. The worker therefore reserves no PyNv decoder/CUDA-context bytes. A later request can still set media_io_kwargs.video.video_backend="pynvvideocodec" and reach the GPU decoder path because that runtime field is intentionally honored by VideoMediaIO.
PoV
An ordinary multimodal inference request can carry the backend override in the request body:
{
"model": "served-vlm",
"messages": [
{
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "text", "text": "summarize this clip"},
{"type": "video_url", "video_url": {"url": "data:video/mp4;base64,<small-mp4>"}}
]
}
],
"media_io_kwargs": {
"video": {
"video_backend": "pynvvideocodec"
}
}
}
The following bounded source-level check confirms the code path without allocating GPU memory:
git clone --filter=blob:none https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm.git
cd vllm
git checkout ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a
python3 check_pynv_backend_reservation.py --repo .
PoC
The bounded check validates current source markers, simulates the exact static reservation predicate, and compares vulnerable and negative-control configurations. Key output:
{
"vulnerable": true,
"head": "ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a",
"reservation_simulation": {
"env_video_loader_backend": "opencv",
"request_selects_pynv_after_startup": true,
"vulnerable_static_reserved_bytes": 0,
"negative_control_static_pynv_reserved_bytes": 2066953011,
"raw_frame_only_control_reserved_bytes": 268435456,
"unreserved_decoder_bytes_when_only_request_selects_pynv": 2066953011
}
}
The negative control is important: when PyNvVideoCodec is selected statically, the worker reserves 2066953011 bytes per API process for decoder surfaces plus CUDA context. The vulnerable case reserves 0 bytes for the same decoder overhead because PyNvVideoCodec is selected only by the later request. A second control with static OpenCV plus mm_ipc_gpu_memory_gb=0.25 reserves only the raw-frame semaphore budget and still does not reserve PyNv decoder/CUDA-context bytes.
Impact
An attacker who can submit video requests to a vLLM deployment with PyNvVideoCodec available can force frontend GPU decoding even when the engine did not reserve memory for that decoder during startup. On high-utilization serving deployments, the unreserved CUDA context, retained decoder surfaces, and decoded-frame allocations can reduce or exhaust GPU memory that the engine assumed was available for weights, activations, or KV cache, causing request failures, worker crashes, or service-level denial of service.
Suggested severity is Medium with conservative CVSS v3.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (6.5). If a deployment exposes the affected API without authentication, PR:N would raise the deployment-specific score. Suggested weaknesses are CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) and CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption). This should not be rated Low because the affected resource is shared GPU memory in the serving path and the code already treats the PyNv decoder/CUDA-context footprint as large enough to reserve at startup when statically configured.
Limitations: exploitation requires a GPU deployment where PyNvVideoCodec is installed and usable, and the request must reach a video-capable model/path. The issue does not claim code execution, data disclosure, or SSRF.
Suggested Fix
Do not allow untrusted request fields to select a GPU decoder that was not included in startup memory reservation. The simplest fix is to reject request-level media_io_kwargs.video.video_backend="pynvvideocodec" unless the static server configuration already selected PyNvVideoCodec and reserved its decoder/CUDA-context budget.
If dynamic backend selection remains supported, split software and GPU decoder policies: allow request selection among CPU/software decoders only, require an explicit operator allowlist for GPU decoders, and include every request-selectable GPU decoder in the startup reservation predicate. Add regression coverage for static OpenCV startup config plus request-level PyNvVideoCodec override, and preserve the negative control where static PyNvVideoCodec configuration reserves decoder/CUDA-context bytes.
Affected Package/Versions
Package: vllm from vllm-project/vllm.
Confirmed affected: current main at ddd3855a28a561a5bb54d380c6e6b8b1e883cc4a.
Introduced by: af16446bf39de047ab57649c933063cf1cbf1e50, Vram semaphore infra (#44465), committed 2026-06-26T17:32:51-07:00.
Release status checked: git tag --contains af16446bf returned no release tags in the fresh checkout. GitHub repository metadata reported latest published release v0.23.0 published 2026-06-15T05:27:20Z; the local v0.24.0 tag also does not contain the introducing commit. The affected range should therefore be current main builds containing af16446bf until fixed, rather than a confirmed released-version range.
Advisory History
Public vLLM advisories checked included audio decompression-bomb DoS, unbounded video/jpeg frame-count DoS, MediaConnector SSRF, video processing RCE, multimodal embedding DoS/RCE, GGUF GPU memory exposure, multimodal hashing, and other request-parameter DoS classes. None matched request-selected PyNvVideoCodec or the static VRAM reservation mismatch.
Prior local/private vLLM report families checked included request-level media_io_kwargs reopening video/jpeg frame fanout, GLM video metadata amplification, and audio media decode duration-limit bypass. Those reports share the request-level media kwargs boundary, but they target CPU/media decode limits or model metadata amplification. This report targets a different privileged asset and fix surface: GPU decoder selection after engine startup memory reservation.
Focused GitHub issue/PR searches for pynvvideocodec, mm_ipc_gpu_memory, video_backend media_io_kwargs, Vram semaphore infra, and frontend multimodal GPU decoding found the PyNvVideoCodec zero-copy RFC, an old do-not-review prototype, merged PR #44465, and an unrelated TorchCodec backend PR. No public issue or PR described this security boundary.
Appendix: Bounded Source-Level Check
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import re
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
MIB = 1024 * 1024
GIB = 1024 * MIB
def read(repo: Path, rel: str) -> str:
return (repo / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def const_int(source: str, name: str) -> int:
expr = re.search(rf"^{name}\s*=\s*(.+)$", source, flags=re.MULTILINE).group(1).strip()
if expr == "128 * MiB_bytes":
return 128 * MIB
if expr == "int(1.8 * 1024 * MiB_bytes)":
return int(1.8 * 1024 * MIB)
if expr == "1":
return 1
raise AssertionError(expr)
def uses_pynv_static(static_media_io_kwargs: dict[str, dict[str, str]], env_backend: str) -> bool:
video_kwargs = static_media_io_kwargs.get("video", {})
video_loader_backend = video_kwargs.get("video_backend") or env_backend
codec_backend = video_kwargs.get("backend")
return video_loader_backend == "pynvvideocodec" or codec_backend == "pynvvideocodec"
def reserve_bytes(static_media_io_kwargs, env_backend, mm_ipc_gpu_memory_gb, decoder_bytes, cuda_context_bytes, retained_decoders):
raw_frame_reserved_bytes = int(mm_ipc_gpu_memory_gb * GIB)
per_server_decoder_bytes = decoder_bytes * retained_decoders + cuda_context_bytes
decoder_reserved_bytes = per_server_decoder_bytes if uses_pynv_static(static_media_io_kwargs, env_backend) else 0
return raw_frame_reserved_bytes + decoder_reserved_bytes
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("--repo", required=True, type=Path)
repo = parser.parse_args().repo.resolve()
media_video = read(repo, "vllm/multimodal/media/video.py")
connector = read(repo, "vllm/multimodal/media/connector.py")
chat_protocol = read(repo, "vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/protocol.py")
responses_protocol = read(repo, "vllm/entrypoints/openai/responses/protocol.py")
gpu_worker = read(repo, "vllm/v1/worker/gpu_worker.py")
video_core = read(repo, "vllm/multimodal/video.py")
assert "media_io_kwargs: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] | None = Field(" in chat_protocol
assert "media_io_kwargs: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] | None = Field(" in responses_protocol
assert 'video_io_kwargs = dict(self.media_io_kwargs.get("video", {}))' in connector
assert 'if "video_backend" not in video_io_kwargs and (' in connector
assert 'kwargs.pop("video_backend", None) or envs.VLLM_VIDEO_LOADER_BACKEND' in media_video
assert "elif backend == PYNVVIDEOCODEC_VIDEO_BACKEND:" in video_core
assert 'video_kwargs = mm_config.media_io_kwargs.get("video", {})' in gpu_worker
decoder_bytes = const_int(video_core, "PYNVVIDEOCODEC_DECODER_GPU_MEMORY_BYTES")
retained_decoders = const_int(video_core, "PYNVVIDEOCODEC_MAX_RETAINED_DECODERS")
cuda_context_bytes = const_int(video_core, "PYNVVIDEOCODEC_CUDA_CONTEXT_BYTES")
per_server_decoder_bytes = decoder_bytes * retained_decoders + cuda_context_bytes
vulnerable_static_reserved = reserve_bytes({}, "opencv", 0.0, decoder_bytes, cuda_context_bytes, retained_decoders)
negative_control_reserved = reserve_bytes({"video": {"video_backend": "pynvvideocodec"}}, "opencv", 0.0, decoder_bytes, cuda_context_bytes, retained_decoders)
raw_frame_only_control = reserve_bytes({}, "opencv", 0.25, decoder_bytes, cuda_context_bytes, retained_decoders)
head = subprocess.check_output(["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True).strip()
print(json.dumps({
"head": head,
"vulnerable": vulnerable_static_reserved == 0 and negative_control_reserved == per_server_decoder_bytes,
"reservation_simulation": {
"env_video_loader_backend": "opencv",
"request_selects_pynv_after_startup": True,
"vulnerable_static_reserved_bytes": vulnerable_static_reserved,
"negative_control_static_pynv_reserved_bytes": negative_control_reserved,
"raw_frame_only_control_reserved_bytes": raw_frame_only_control,
"unreserved_decoder_bytes_when_only_request_selects_pynv": per_server_decoder_bytes,
},
}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | vllm | all versions | 0.28.0pip install --upgrade 'vllm==0.28.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vllm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update vllm to 0.28.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-8pw2-6jv3-mj5j across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.