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🐘 Packagist

GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r

HIGH

TYPO3 Arbitrary Code Execution via File List Module

Published
Jun 7, 2024
Updated
Dec 4, 2024
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐘typo3/cms🐘typo3/cms

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Due to missing file extensions in $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['BE'][‘fileDenyPattern’], backend users are allowed to upload *.phar, *.shtml, *.pl or *.cgi files which can be executed in certain web server setups. A valid backend user account is needed in order to exploit this vulnerability.

Derivatives of Debian GNU Linux are handling *.phar files as PHP applications since PHP 7.1 (for unofficial packages) and PHP 7.2 (for official packages).

The file extension *.shtml is bound to server side includes which are not enabled per default in most common Linux based distributions. File extension *.pl and *.cgi require additional handlers to be configured which is also not the case in most common distributions (except for /cgi-bin/ location).

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagisttypo3/cms8.0.0&&< 8.7.238.7.23
🐘Packagisttypo3/cms9.0.0&&< 9.5.49.5.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for typo3/cms. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update typo3/cms to 8.7.23 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Due to missing file extensions in $GLOBALS['TYPO3_CONF_VARS']['BE'][‘fileDenyPattern’], backend users are allowed to upload *.phar, *.shtml, *.pl or *.cgi files which can be executed in certain web server setups. A valid backend user account is needed in order to exploit this vulnerability. Derivatives of Debian GNU Linux are handling *.phar files as PHP applications since PHP 7.1 (for unofficial packages) and PHP 7.2 (for official packages). The file extension *.shtml is bound to server side includes which are not enabled per default in most common Linux based distributions. File extension
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8h4m-r4wm-xj7r across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.