GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw
MEDIUMDenial of service of Minder Server from maliciously crafted GitHub attestations
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/stacklok/minderReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Minder is vulnerable to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack which could allow an attacker to crash the Minder server and deny other users access to it.
The root cause of the vulnerability is that Minders sigstore verifier reads an untrusted response entirely into memory without enforcing a limit on the response body. An attacker can exploit this by making Minder make a request to an attacker-controlled endpoint which returns a response with a large body which will crash the Minder server.
Specifically, the point of failure is where Minder parses the response from the GitHub attestations endpoint in getAttestationReply. Here, Minder makes a request to the orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref GitHub endpoint (line 285) and then parses the response into the AttestationReply (line 295):
The way Minder parses the response on line 295 makes it prone to DoS if the response is large enough. Essentially, the response needs to be larger than the machine has available memory.
To demonstrate this in an isolated way, consider the following example:
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
)
type Attestation struct {
Bundle json.RawMessage `json:"bundle"`
}
type AttestationReply struct {
Attestations []Attestation `json:"attestations"`
}
func main() {
m1 := strings.NewReader("{\"attestations\":[")
maliciousBody := strings.NewReader(strings.Repeat("{\"bundle\":{\"k\": \"v\"{{,", 100000000))
m2 := strings.NewReader("{\"bundle\":{\"k\": \"v\"}}]}")
maliciousBodyReader := io.MultiReader(m1, maliciousBody, maliciousBody, maliciousBody, m2)
fmt.Println("Created malicious body")
var attestationReply AttestationReply
_ = json.NewDecoder(maliciousBodyReader).Decode(&attestationReply)
}
This example mimics the behavior of Minders getAttestationReply and how a malicious response body passed to getAttestationReply’s parsing of the response will cause DoS.
When running this script locally on my system, Go incrementally increases memory consumption up to above 90%, freezes the machine and then performs a sigkill.
Attack vector
The content that is hosted at the orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref GitHub attestation endpoint is controlled by users including unauthenticated users to Minders threat model. However, a user will need to configure their own Minder settings to cause Minder to make Minder send a request to fetch the attestations. The user would need to know of a package whose attestations were configured in such a way that they would return a large response when fetching them. As such, the steps needed to carry out this attack would look as such:
- The attacker adds a package to ghcr.io with attestations that can be fetched via the
orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumrefGitHub endpoint. - The attacker registers on Minder and makes Minder fetch the attestations.
- Minder fetches attestations and crashes thereby being denied of service.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/stacklok/minder | all versions | 0.0.51 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/stacklok/minder. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/stacklok/minder to 0.0.51 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-8fmj-33gw-g7pw across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.