How severe is GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4?

GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 has a CVSS score of 6.5/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4?

GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 affects the following packages: thorsten/phpmyfaq (Packagist), phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4?

Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4?

GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 is classified as CWE-862 (CWE-862). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 was published on June 23, 2026 and was last updated on June 23, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4: thorsten/phpmyfaq (Medium 6.5)

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Missing Authorization in API CategoryController — CVE-2026-24421 fixed BackupController by adding userHasPermission(PermissionType::BACKUP). The same fix was NOT applied to 4 other write endpoints in the public API. All 4 only call hasValidToken() (shared API key) but never call userHasPermission(), allowing any API token holder to perform admin operations regardless of their user permissions.

Summary

CVE-2026-24421 fixed BackupController by adding: $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::BACKUP);

The same fix was NOT applied to 4 other write endpoints in the public API. All 4 only call $this->hasValidToken() — which checks a shared API key header, NOT the individual user's role permissions.

Affected Endpoints

src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/CategoryController.php → create() POST /api/v4.0/category Missing: userHasPermission(PermissionType::CATEGORY_ADD) Any API token holder can create categories regardless of user role.
src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/FaqController.php → create() POST /api/v4.0/faq Missing: userHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_ADD) Any API token holder can create FAQ entries regardless of user role.
src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/FaqController.php → update() PUT /api/v4.0/faq Missing: userHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT) Any API token holder can update any FAQ entry regardless of user role.
src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/QuestionController.php → create() POST /api/v4.0/question Missing: permission check Any API token holder can create questions regardless of user role.

Root Cause

All 4 methods only call: $this->hasValidToken(); ← shared API key, not per-user

The fixed BackupController correctly calls: $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::BACKUP);

PermissionType::CATEGORY_ADD, FAQ_ADD, FAQ_EDIT all exist in src/phpMyFAQ/Enums/PermissionType.php — they just are not being used.

Fix

Add userHasPermission() before the logic in each method:

// CategoryController.create()
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CATEGORY_ADD);

// FaqController.create()
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_ADD);

// FaqController.update()
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::FAQ_EDIT);

Reporter

CONTACT Santhoshini Ganta Github:@santhoshinipayload Email: [email protected] LinkedIn: http://linkedin.com/in/santhoshini-g-1440621ba

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`thorsten/phpmyfaq`	all versions	4.1.4
🐘Packagist	`phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq`	all versions	4.1.4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Missing Authorization in API CategoryController — CVE-2026-24421 fixed BackupController by adding userHasPermission(PermissionType::BACKUP). The same fix was NOT applied to 4 other write endpoints in the public API. All 4 only call hasValidToken() (shared API key) but never call userHasPermission(), allowing any API token holder to perform admin operations regardless of their user permissions. ## Summary CVE-2026-24421 fixed BackupController by adding: $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::BACKUP); The same fix was NOT applied to 4 other write endpoints in the public API. All 4 only ca

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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GHSA-8c6h-7g6x-m5x4