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HIGH severity

SyncChannel<T> can move 'T: !Send' to other threadsGHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f

HIGH

GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) CWE-362 vulnerability in signal-simple. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

Also known asCVE-2020-36446GHSA-36cg-4jff-5863RUSTSEC-2020-0126
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs54th percentile — riskier than 54% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.42%0.84%1.27%0.3%0.8%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,386 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀signal-simple

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implement Send/Sync for SyncChannel<T>. SyncChannel<T> doesn't provide access to &T but merely serves as a channel that consumes and returns owned T. Users can create UB in safe Rust by sending T: !Send to other threads with SyncChannel::send/recv APIs. Using T = Arc<Cell<_> allows to create data races (which can lead to memory corruption), and using T = MutexGuard<T> allows to unlock a mutex from a thread that didn't lock the mutex.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosignal-simpleall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
signal-simplesignal-simple_project
≤ 2020-11-15
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for signal-simple, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of signal-simple has shipped for GHSA-8892-84wf-cg8f yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Constrain what reaches the vulnerable code: limit the size and shape of untrusted input, isolate the affected component in a sandboxed or least-privileged process, and enable the platform's memory-safety mitigations (ASLR, stack protector, hardened allocator) so an out-of-bounds access is more likely to fail closed than to be exploitable.

Frequently Asked Questions

Affected versions of this crate unconditionally implement Send/Sync for `SyncChannel<T>`. `SyncChannel<T>` doesn't provide access to `&T` but merely serves as a channel that consumes and returns owned `T`. Users can create UB in safe Rust by sending `T: !Send` to other threads with `SyncChannel::send/recv` APIs. Using `T = Arc<Cell<_>` allows to create data races (which can lead to memory corruption), and using `T = MutexGuard<T>` allows to unlock a mutex from a thread that didn't lock the mutex.
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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SyncChannel<T> can move 'T: !Send' to other threads