Decidim: Verification admins can access supplied IDs from other organizationsGHSA-86fh-w43w-338c
MEDIUMFix: decidim/decidim#16666GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) CWE-639 vulnerability in decidim-verifications. A fix is available for decidim-verifications — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 385,386 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
decidim-verifications💎decidim-verifications💎decidim-verificationsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description
The verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.
Technical description
The verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw Authorization.find(...) and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.
Reproduction steps:
- An org2 participant uploads their ID:
- An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g
http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new
- The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)
- Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:
Impact
A tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant's id_documents requests.
Patches
See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666
Workarounds
Disable the "Identity documents" verification
Reference
OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control
Credits
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | decidim-verifications | all versions | 0.30.9bundle update decidim-verifications --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | decidim-verifications | ≥ 0.31.0.rc1&&< 0.31.5 | 0.31.5bundle update decidim-verifications --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | decidim-verifications | ≥ 0.32.0.rc1&&< 0.32.0 | 0.32.0bundle update decidim-verifications --conservative |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-verifications, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update decidim-verifications to 0.30.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c in your dependencies?
Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.