GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) CWE-639 vulnerability in decidim-verifications. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Decidim: Verification admins can access supplied IDs from other organizations
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c.
Real-World Exposure
decidim-verifications💎decidim-verifications💎decidim-verificationsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Description
The verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.
Technical description
The verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw Authorization.find(...) and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.
Reproduction steps:
- An org2 participant uploads their ID:
- An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g
http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new
- The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)
- Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:
Impact
A tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant's id_documents requests.
Patches
See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666
Workarounds
Disable the "Identity documents" verification
Reference
OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control
Credits
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | decidim-verifications | all versions | 0.30.9 |
| 💎RubyGems | decidim-verifications | ≥ 0.31.0.rc1&&< 0.31.5 | 0.31.5 |
| 💎RubyGems | decidim-verifications | ≥ 0.32.0.rc1&&< 0.32.0 | 0.32.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for decidim-verifications. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update decidim-verifications to 0.30.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c across RubyGems dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.