CSRF allows attacker to finalize/unfinalize order adjustments in solidus_backendGHSA-8639-qx56-r428
LOWFix: solidusio/solidus@de796a2GHSA-8639-qx56-r428 is a low-severity (CVSS 2.3) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in solidus_backend. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for solidus_backend — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8639-qx56-r428.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
solidus_backend💎solidus_backend💎solidus_backendReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects RubyGems packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
CSRF vulnerability allowing attackers to change the state of an order's adjustments if they hold its number, and the execution happens on a store administrator's computer.
Reproduction steps:
- Take an order's number.
- Log in as an administrator.
- Visit that order's adjustments section (Orders -> {Click on number} -> Adjustments) and check that its adjustments are finalized (closed padlock under the State column).
- On another tab, visit
{your_site_url}/admin/orders/{order_number}/adjustments/unfinalize. - Notice how the adjustments are unfinalized (open padlock), even if the previous was a
GETrequest which could have been linked from any other site. - Visit
{your_site_url}/admin/orders/{order_number}/adjustments/finalize. - Notice how the adjustments are again finalized.
That happened because both routes were handled as GET requests, which are skipped by Rails anti-forgery protection.
Patches
Users should upgrade to solidus_backend v3.1.6, v3.0.6, or v2.11.16, depending on the major and minor versions in use.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Open an issue or a discussion in Solidus.
- Email us at [email protected]
- Contact the core team on Slack
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💎RubyGems | solidus_backend | all versions | 2.11.16bundle update solidus_backend --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | solidus_backend | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.0.6 | 3.0.6bundle update solidus_backend --conservative |
| 💎RubyGems | solidus_backend | ≥ 3.1.0&&< 3.1.6 | 3.1.6bundle update solidus_backend --conservative |
Affected Products
solidusnebulabResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for solidus_backend, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update solidus_backend to 2.11.16 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8639-qx56-r428 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8639-qx56-r428 in your dependencies?
Find it across RubyGems, including transitive dependencies.