GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq
CRITICALGHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Missing Authentication vulnerability in praisonai. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
PraisonAI `deploy --type api` emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 365,017 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
praisonaiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (praisonai deploy --type api) get a server that:
- binds to
0.0.0.0per the recommended sample YAML - exposes
/chatand/agentsendpoints - runs
praisonai.run()on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment - does not require any authentication
The PyPI wheel praisonai==4.6.33 (current @latest) still ships the generator with auth_enabled defaulting to False. The fix shape is opt-in via APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...).
Details
Anchor (file:line:symbol)
- Vulnerable artifact:
praisonai==4.6.33on PyPI. - Defaults:
praisonai/deploy/models.py:29—auth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False, ...);praisonai/deploy/models.py:30—auth_token: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, ...). - Generator:
praisonai/deploy/api.py:40—AUTH_ENABLED = {config.auth_enabled};api.py:41—AUTH_TOKEN = {repr(config.auth_token)};api.py:43-49—def check_auth(): if not AUTH_ENABLED: return True. - CLI entry: documented as
praisonai deploy --type api(vendor README); produces the generator output above with no flag required to suppress the warning, because no warning is emitted.
Vulnerable code (verbatim from installed wheel)
# praisonai/deploy/models.py (praisonai==4.6.33)
class APIConfig(BaseModel):
host: str = Field(default="127.0.0.1", description="Server host")
port: int = Field(default=8005, description="Server port")
cors_enabled: bool = Field(default=True, description="Enable CORS")
auth_enabled: bool = Field(default=False, description="Enable authentication") # line 29
auth_token: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, description="Authentication token") # line 30
# praisonai/deploy/api.py (praisonai==4.6.33)
code = f\'\'\'...
# Authentication
AUTH_ENABLED = {config.auth_enabled} # False by default
AUTH_TOKEN = {repr(config.auth_token)} # None by default
def check_auth():
if not AUTH_ENABLED:
return True # short-circuit, accept all
token = request.headers.get(\'Authorization\', \'\').replace(\'Bearer \', \'\')
return token == AUTH_TOKEN
...
\'\'\'
A default invocation of the deploy command emits a server whose check_auth() short-circuits to True and accepts unauthenticated /chat, /agents POSTs.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
legend-c420 PoC - PraisonAI 4.6.33 generates Flask API server with auth
disabled by default. Class H sibling of CVE-2026-44338.
Phase 1: reflect on praisonai.deploy.models.APIConfig defaults.
Phase 2: call generate_api_server_code(default config) and assert the
emitted source contains AUTH_ENABLED = False and the
short-circuit return.
Phase 3: re-run with auth_enabled=True, auth_token='s3cret-bearer-value'
and confirm the emitted source flips to the secure shape.
Exit code 0 = PASS = vulnerable defaults confirmed.
"""
import sys, traceback
def phase1_dataclass_defaults():
print("PHASE 1 - praisonai.deploy.models.APIConfig default values")
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
cfg = APIConfig()
checks = [
("auth_enabled", cfg.auth_enabled, False),
("auth_token", cfg.auth_token, None),
]
for name, observed, expected in checks:
ok = observed == expected
mark = "VULNERABLE" if name in ("auth_enabled","auth_token") and ok else "ok"
print(f" {name:14s} = {observed!r:18s} (expected {expected!r}) [{mark}]")
assert ok
print(" >> APIConfig defaults reproduce the CVE-2026-44338 shape.")
def phase2_default_generator_emits_unauth():
print("PHASE 2 - generate_api_server_code(default config) emits unauth server")
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
src = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config=APIConfig())
for needle in ["AUTH_ENABLED = False","AUTH_TOKEN = None","if not AUTH_ENABLED:","return True"]:
assert needle in src, f"missing: {needle!r}"
print(f" [FOUND] {needle!r}")
print(" >> Default-config generator emits Flask server with check_auth() short-circuit.")
def phase3_fix_shape_available():
print("PHASE 3 - auth_enabled=True flips to secure shape")
from praisonai.deploy.models import APIConfig
from praisonai.deploy.api import generate_api_server_code
cfg = APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token="s3cret-bearer-value")
src = generate_api_server_code("agents.yaml", config=cfg)
assert "AUTH_ENABLED = True" in src
assert "AUTH_ENABLED = False" not in src
print(" >> Fix shape works when toggled. Class H confirmed: default is insecure.")
def main():
print("=" * 64)
print("legend-c420 PoC - PraisonAI default-config AUTH_ENABLED=False")
print("=" * 64)
try:
phase1_dataclass_defaults()
phase2_default_generator_emits_unauth()
phase3_fix_shape_available()
except Exception:
traceback.print_exc()
print("FAIL"); sys.exit(2)
print("PASS 3/3 phases. EXIT 0.")
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
PoC dependencies: praisonai==4.6.33 from PyPI. Tested on Python 3.11.
Run log verdict: PASS 3/3 phases. EXIT 0. — vulnerable-default shape confirmed. auth_enabled=False by default, check_auth() short-circuits to True, fix toggle exists but is opt-in.
Impact
An operator who runs the vendor-documented quickstart (pip install praisonai && praisonai deploy --type api) gets a network-reachable Flask server that invokes praisonai.run() on attacker-supplied JSON with the user's LLM API keys in the process environment. The attacker reaches arbitrary LLM-orchestration (including any tool-use the agents define, which in PraisonAI commonly includes python_repl, bash, file I/O, and HTTP calls), with the host's API-key credit billed to the operator.
- Belief: CVE-2026-44338 was filed and triaged.
- Reality:
praisonai==4.6.33is current@lateston PyPI (2026-05-16). The generator still defaults toauth_enabled=False. - Gap: The CVE acknowledges the fix shape exists. The fix is opt-in. The default-config consumer remains vulnerable.
Parent CVE: CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | praisonai | all versions | 4.6.40 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update praisonai to 4.6.40 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-8444-4fhq-fxpq across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.