GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7 — filebrowser
GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7 is a CWE-305 vulnerability in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
File Browser’s insecure JWT handling can lead to session replay attacks after logout
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
File Browser’s authentication system issues long-lived JWT tokens that remain valid even after the user logs out. Please refer to the CWE's listed in this report for further reference and system standards. In summary, the main issue is:
- Tokens remain valid after logout (session replay attacks)
In this report, I used docker as the documentation instruct:
docker run \
-v filebrowser_data:/srv \
-v filebrowser_database:/database \
-v filebrowser_config:/config \
-p 8080:80 \
filebrowser/filebrowser
Details
Issue: Tokens remain valid after logout (session replay attacks)
After logging in and receiving a JWT token, the user can explicitly "log out." However, this action does not invalidate the issued JWT. Any captured token can be replayed post-logout until it expires naturally. The backend does not track active sessions or invalidate existing tokens on logout. Login request:
POST /api/login HTTP/1.1
Host: machine.local:8090
Content-Length: 69
{"username":"admin","password":"password-here","recaptcha":""}
The check found in the code https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/auth.go is not enough. There is no server-side blacklist or token invalidation on logout. Token renewal and validity only depends on expiry and user store timestamps:
expired := !tk.VerifyExpiresAt(time.Now().Add(time.Hour), true)
updated := tk.IssuedAt != nil && tk.IssuedAt.Unix() < d.store.Users.LastUpdate(tk.User.ID)
PoC
Issue: Tokens remain valid after logout (session replay attacks)
- Login and capture the generate JWT. Eg. the http request:
POST /api/login HTTP/1.1
Host: machine.local:8090
Content-Length: 69
{"username":"admin","password":"password-here","recaptcha":""}
- Logout in the dashboard. And then try to use the old generated JWT to access any authenticated endpoint eg:
GET /api/resources HTTP/1.1
Host: machine.local:8090
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/138.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
X-Auth: Old-JWT-token-here
Content-Length: 173
Accept: */*
Referer: http://machine.local:8090/files/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
Content-Length: 26
Connection: keep-alive
Impact
- A valid JWT remains active after user logout.
- If stolen, tokens persist access indefinitely until expiry.
- Violates OWASP Top 10 A2:2021 - Broken Authentication.
Recommendations
- Read all CWE's attached in this report
- Invalidate JWTs on logout via session store / token blacklist.
- Reduce JWT ExpiresAt where possible or use short-lived + refresh tokens.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser | all versions | No fix |
| 🐹Go | github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser has shipped for GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-7xwp-2cpp-p8r7 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.