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GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr

The DES/3DES cipher was used as part of the TLS protocol by installation tools

Also known asGO-2024-2441
Published
Jan 3, 2024
Updated
Jun 28, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/karmada-io/karmada

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

The Karmada components deployed with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.

The components affected are:

  • karmada-apiserver
  • karmada-aggregated-apiserver
  • karmada-search
  • karmada-metrics-adapter
  • etcd

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

From Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart, the default minimum TLS version of components(include karmada-apiserver, karmada-aggregated-apiserver, karmada-search, and karmada-metrics-adapter) would be set to TLS1.3 to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305) for etcd.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

By setting the --tls-min-version for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the --cipher-suites to secure algorithms.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

  1. Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191
  2. Impact discussions from the Golang community: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/karmada-io/karmadaall versions1.8.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/karmada-io/karmada. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/karmada-io/karmada to 1.8.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ The Karmada components deployed with `karmadactl`, `karma-operator`, and `helm chart` take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.