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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp mindsdb

HIGH

GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp is a high-severity (CVSS 8.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in mindsdb. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for mindsdb — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Arbitrary file write in mindsdb when Extracting Tarballs retrieved from a remote location

Also known asCVE-2022-23522PYSEC-2023-26
Published
Mar 30, 2023
Updated
Oct 1, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile — riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍mindsdb

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An unsafe extraction is being performed using shutil.unpack_archive() from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant.

Details

Unpacking files using the high-level function shutil.unpack_archive() from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory.

As can be seen in the vulnerable snippet code source, an archive is being retrieved using the download_file() function from a remote location which is a user-provided permanent storage bucket s3. Immediately after being retrieved, the tarball is unsafely unpacked using the function shutil.unpack_archive().

The vulnerable code is L128..L129 in fs.py file.

    def __init__(self):
        super().__init__()
        if 's3_credentials' in self.config['permanent_storage']:
            self.s3 = boto3.client('s3', **self.config['permanent_storage']['s3_credentials'])
        else:
            self.s3 = boto3.client('s3')
       
        # User provided remote storage!
        self.bucket = self.config['permanent_storage']['bucket'] 

    def get(self, local_name, base_dir):
        remote_name = local_name
        remote_ziped_name = f'{remote_name}.tar.gz'
        local_ziped_name = f'{local_name}.tar.gz'
        local_ziped_path = os.path.join(base_dir, local_ziped_name)
        os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)
        
        # Retrieve a potentially malicious tarball
        self.s3.download_file(self.bucket, remote_ziped_name, local_ziped_path)

        # Perform an unsafe extraction
        shutil.unpack_archive(local_ziped_path, base_dir)

        os.system(f'chmod -R 777 {base_dir}')
        os.remove(local_ziped_path)

PoC

The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file sim4n6.txt to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.

> tar --list -f archive.tar
tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names
../../../sim4n6.txt

> python3 
Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov  2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import shutil
>>> shutil.unpack_archive("archive.tar")
>>> exit()

> test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists"
sim4n6.txt exists

Attack Scenario

An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely using a personal bucket s3, thus, retrieve the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server.

Mitigation

Potential mitigation could be to:

  • Use a safer module, like zipfile.
  • Validate the location of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path .. or absolute path such as /etc/password.
  • Perform a checksum verification for the retrieved archive, but hard-coding the hashes may be cumbersome and difficult to manage.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImindsdball versions22.11.4.3pip install --upgrade 'mindsdb==22.11.4.3'
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mindsdb, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update mindsdb to 22.11.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An unsafe extraction is being performed using `shutil.unpack_archive()` from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a **TarSlip** or a **ZipSlip variant**. ### Details Unpacking files using the high-level function `shutil.unpack_archive()` from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory. As can be seen in the vulne
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp: mindsdb (High 8.5) | O3 Security