GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp
HIGHGHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp is a high-severity (CVSS 8.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in mindsdb. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Arbitrary file write in mindsdb when Extracting Tarballs retrieved from a remote location
Blast Radius
mindsdbReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unsafe extraction is being performed using shutil.unpack_archive() from a remotely retrieved tarball. Which may lead to the writing of the extracted files to an unintended location. This vulnerability is sometimes called a TarSlip or a ZipSlip variant.
Details
Unpacking files using the high-level function shutil.unpack_archive() from a potentially malicious tarball without validating that the destination file path remained within the intended destination directory may cause files to be overwritten outside the destination directory.
As can be seen in the vulnerable snippet code source, an archive is being retrieved using the download_file() function from a remote location which is a user-provided permanent storage bucket s3. Immediately after being retrieved, the tarball is unsafely unpacked using the function shutil.unpack_archive().
The vulnerable code is L128..L129 in fs.py file.
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
if 's3_credentials' in self.config['permanent_storage']:
self.s3 = boto3.client('s3', **self.config['permanent_storage']['s3_credentials'])
else:
self.s3 = boto3.client('s3')
# User provided remote storage!
self.bucket = self.config['permanent_storage']['bucket']
def get(self, local_name, base_dir):
remote_name = local_name
remote_ziped_name = f'{remote_name}.tar.gz'
local_ziped_name = f'{local_name}.tar.gz'
local_ziped_path = os.path.join(base_dir, local_ziped_name)
os.makedirs(base_dir, exist_ok=True)
# Retrieve a potentially malicious tarball
self.s3.download_file(self.bucket, remote_ziped_name, local_ziped_path)
# Perform an unsafe extraction
shutil.unpack_archive(local_ziped_path, base_dir)
os.system(f'chmod -R 777 {base_dir}')
os.remove(local_ziped_path)
PoC
The following PoC is provided for illustration purposes only. It showcases the risk of extracting a non-harmless text file sim4n6.txt to one of the parent locations rather than the intended current folder.
> tar --list -f archive.tar
tar: Removing leading "../../../" from member names
../../../sim4n6.txt
> python3
Python 3.10.6 (main, Nov 2 2022, 18:53:38) [GCC 11.3.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> import shutil
>>> shutil.unpack_archive("archive.tar")
>>> exit()
> test -f ../../../sim4n6.txt && echo "sim4n6.txt exists"
sim4n6.txt exists
Attack Scenario
An attacker could craft a malicious tarball with a filename path, such as ../../../../../../../../etc/passwd, and then serve the archive remotely using a personal bucket s3, thus, retrieve the tarball through mindsdb and overwrite the system files of the hosting server.
Mitigation
Potential mitigation could be to:
- Use a safer module, like
zipfile. - Validate the location of the extracted files and discard those with malicious paths such as relative path
..or absolute path such as/etc/password. - Perform a checksum verification for the retrieved archive, but hard-coding the hashes may be cumbersome and difficult to manage.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | mindsdb | all versions | 22.11.4.3 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for mindsdb. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update mindsdb to 22.11.4.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-7x45-phmr-9wqp across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.